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ARTICLES
Brown in State Hands: State Policymaking
and Educational Equality After
Freeman v. Pitts
By BERNARD JAMES* and JULIE M. HOFFMAN**
At some time, we must acknowledge that it has become absurd to
assume, without any further proof, that violations of the Constitution
dating from the days when Lyndon Johnson was President, or ear-
lier, continue to have an appreciable effect upon current operation of
schools. We are close to that time. 1
--Justice Antonin Scalia
This, then, is the dread that seems to lie beneath the fear of equaliz-
ing. Equity is seen as dispossession. Local autonomy is seen as lib-
erty... Again there is this stunted image of our nation as a land
that can afford one of two dreams-liberty or equity-but cannotmanage both. 2
-- Jonathan Kozol
On the constitutional Richter scale, Brown v. Board of Education
3
has proven to be one of the few truly high magnitude tremors. Its after-
shocks continue to provide a jolt to equal protection jurisprudence. It is
fair to add that the impact of Brown jurisprudence extends even to con-
temporary areas of law not usually associated with notions of suspect
classifications and discrimination.4
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. B.G.S., LD., University of
Michigan.
** Research Analyst, LEARN (Los Angeles Educational Alliance for Restructuring
Now). B.A., University of California, San Diego; J.D. Pepperdine University.
1. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1453 (1992) (Scalia, ., concurring).
2. JONATHAN KozOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 173
(1991).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. In the recent abortion case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992)
(plurality opinion), Justice O'Connor, writing against the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), relied on the Brown decision as a barometer for stare decisis: "[Tihe sustained and
widespread debate Roe has provoked calls for some comparison between that case and others
of comparable dimension that have responded to national controversies and taken on the im-
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Most attention is directed to notions of equality and federalism-
Brown's rule that race is an invalid classification for policymaking and
the constitutional principle that states as sovereigns are free to enact laws
that further policies distinct from those of the central government. With
this focus, one discovers the contradictions of the Brown era and their
impact on public education: supremacy versus autonomy, delegation
versus accountability, liberty versus equality. Point and counterpoint.
The initial impact of the Brown decision on public education not
only shattered the idea of racial classification, but also dismissed what
remained of the concept of states rights, particularly as that label was
used for the notion that federal policies could be acknowledged or ig-
nored. An interesting and often problematical state-federal relationship
evolved after Brown-Brown III in particular-and its emphasis on a
deliberate dismantling of local school systems that have been built on
invidious classifications and inequitable programs. States either did
nothing at all in the way of formulating new educational policies or acted
defensively in response to supervised federal orders and coercive federal
spending programs. While the evolution of this relationship clarified
much of what we now associate with modem federal supremacy, it has
created a new set of problems concerning the ultimate accountability for
formulating educational policies to address inequalities arising out of
race, wealth, and other classifications.
These problems come into sharper focus when one considers the fu-
ture impact of Brown on educational policymaking after Freeman v.
Pitts.6 This twenty-year long desegregation battle involved the policies of
the DeKalb County, Georgia school system. The Court held that federal
judicial supervision of the implementation of consent decrees to integrate
public schools could occur on a piecemeal basis. After Freeman, judges
have discretion to identify incremental progress toward a unitary school
district and relinquish jurisdiction over those areas ostensibly free from
press of the controversies addressed." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2812. See also Michelle Oberman,
Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems of Pregnant Women Who Use
Drugs, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1992); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in
Brown v. Board, 91 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1867 (1991); Book Review, Banning the Bomb: Law and
Its Limits, Nuclear Weapons and Law, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1986); Book Note, Judicial
Review in Comparative Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1449 (1990).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown I1].
6. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992). This article does not focus squarely on Freeman except to
suggest how the decision might further distort the role of states in taking responsibility for
promoting educational equality. For a more critical examination of Freeman, see Kevin
Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the
Disease?, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1992); see also Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice
Marshall's Desegregation Opinions, 61 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 69 (1992).
BROWN IN STATE HANDS
the vestiges of official race-based policymaking.7 Approved in the sweep
of the Court's reasoning was a decision by the judge in the DeKalb case
to relinquish jurisdiction as to student assignments, transportation, phys-
ical facilities, and extracurricular activities. Remedial authority was re-
tained to supervise progress on faculty assignments, resource allocation,
and the quality of education being offered to the white and black students
in the district.
The willingness of the Court in Freeman to permit federal judges to
fragment their remedial authority over desegregation also seemed influ-
enced by competing concerns of federalism and equality. The former
was used to justify the Court's preference that local educational policies
in the long run be advanced by public officials. The Court reasoned that
because judicial supervision in Brown litigation often had a long term
impact on school districts (in DeKalb County, the federal court began its
remedial supervision in 1969), partial relinquishment of jurisdiction was
"an important and significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to
return the operations and control of schools to local authorities."' "Re-
turning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practica-
ble date," opined the majority, "is essential to restore their true
accountability in our governmental system." 9
It is on the equality theme, however, where the ruling in Freeman is
most significant. The Court admits that under current doctrine equality
concerns would, in the future, become more difficult to validate and as a
result be outweighed by the desire for autonomy.10 The majority advised
federal judges to act with caution when relinquishing jurisdiction, giving
"particular attention to the school system's record of compliance."11 But
the Justices admitted that over time, the difficulty of making equality
assessments increases as factors other than official race-based policies
contribute to the demographic and systemic characteristics of a school
district. After noting that even DeKalb County was for a brief period in
compliance with the desegregation order, and that later population shifts
accounted for some of the statistical imbalance, the Court concluded:
As the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these
demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a cur-
rent racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de
7. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1445-46.
8. Id. at 1445.
9. Id
10. "[W]ith the passage of time the degree to which racial imbalances continue to repre-
sent vestiges of a constitutional violation may diminish, and the practicability and efficacy of
various remedies can be evaluated with more precision." Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
11. Id.
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jure system. The causal link between current conditions and the
prior violation is even more attenuated if the school district has
demonstrated its good faith.12
It is against this backdrop that the legacy of Brown should be ex-
amined. As aftershocks over time lose their capacity to affect or influ-
ence, so too does the force of law of the Brown jurisprudence. Only the
force of its logic may serve to influence public educational policy in a
nation with a student body that is increasingly diverse, both socially and
economically. When the observations of Justice Scalia in Freeman come
to represent the dominant view of the Court-as surely they must' 3-- an
observer may well conclude that the federalism theme has come full
circle.
But this observation begs the larger question. If one limits the char-
acterization of Brown to the proposition that educational policies based
on racial classifications are per se invalid, this goal has been accom-
plished. No state would consider using race as a criteria for furthering
an otherwise legitimate policy. But beyond racial classifications, the
question becomes how much official resistance remains to the moral in-
fluence of Brown, which postures education as "perhaps the most impor-
tant function of state and local governments."14 As it becomes more
difficult to characterize disparity in public education in constitutional
12. Id. at 1448.
13. It is a fairly well-accepted notion in constitutional law that "the constitutionality of a
statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by show-
ing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist." Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp.
221, 224 (S.D. 111. 1972) (citing Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924)). In
Equal Protection Clause litigation, such an attack may be the only way to prevail when a
suspect classification is not available to raise the level of judicial scrutiny to something higher
than traditional rational basis review. Compare Milnot with the landmark case on rational
basis scrutiny, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Of course, it is also true that in litigation involving fundamental rights, the maintenance
of a constitutional case depends on a stable factual pattern on which both the finding of uncon-
stitutionality and the remedy can be grounded. The rules of justiciability demand as much.
Cases involving injunctions or declaratory judgments are the clearest example of this depen-
dence on factual continuity. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (govern-
ment used lack of factual continuity as defense to defeat request for injunctive relief by plaintiff
injured as result of police chokehold).
Because of the role that continuity plays in case adjudication, it is reasonable to expect, as
does Justice Scalia in Freeman, that without a continuing pattern of what the Court deems
"official government action" to serve as a reinforcing predicate for federal judicial interest in
state and local school board decisionmaking, a natural point of attenuation will occur. This
equation is so predictable that four Justices in Freeman v. Pitts concurred to suggest ways in
which federal district court judges might imply continuity as a basis for future school desegre-
gation orders under the framework of Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1454 (Souter, J., concurring); ia at 1455 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
terms (so as to trigger the safeguards of federal equal protection rules),
states will again find themselves in charge of formulating policies to ad-
dress the remaining facets of inequality.
The equality principle will, in effect, revert to state hands. This, in
some ways, will be a return to normalcy. Public education has been one
of the essential responsibilities of state and local governments. It is the
constitutions of the states, after all, that provide for a "uniform" educa-
tion, 5 a "thorough and efficient" education, 16 and a "right to safe
schools."'17 The school desegregation jurisprudence of the Brown era is
in this respect something of an anomaly developed out of the urgency to
prompt reluctant elected officials to "come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work.., now.'18
If one assumes the eventual demise of Brown, it becomes clear that
more is at stake than the elimination of policies based on racial classifica-
tions. In fact, soon after the mandate of Brown II, the Court expanded
the remedies analysis, going beyond equal pupil assignments based on
race to include other factors. These factors, announced in Green v.
County School Board, suggest a natural extension from race to qualitative
components designed to remove the stigma spawned by maintaining
race-separate schools for decades. 9 Thus, after Brown, what actually
rests in the hands of state policymakers is the resolution of the educa-
tional equality debate.
15. See CoLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("The General Assembly shall, as soon as practicable,
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free pub-
lie schools throughout the State."); IDAHO CONST. art. 9, § 1 ("[lit shall be the duty of the
legislature of Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of
public, free common schools.").
16. See W. VA. CONST. art. 12, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a
thorough and efficient system of free schools."); see also ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1 ("[Ihe
State shall ever maintain a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools and shall
adopt all suitable means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of
education.").
17. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(c) ("All students and staff of public primary, elementary,
junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are
safe, secure and peaceful."). See generally Stuart Biegel, The "Safe Schools" Provision: Can a
Nebulous Constitutional Right Be a Vehicle for Change?, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 789
(1987).
18. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
19. The Green factors include student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, ex-
tracurricular activities, principal and teacher assignments, and general resource allocation. Id
at 435. Significantly, the decision of the Court in Freeman left undisturbed an additional fac-
tor used by the District Court in DeKalb County-the quality of education-a measure of
comparing the trends in the school district in per pupil expenditures and teacher competence.
"It was an appropriate exercise of its discretion for the District Court ... to inquire
whether other elements ought to be identified... in ways that required the formulation of new
and further remedies .... ." Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1446 (1992).
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The state constitutions are good reference points for speculation
about notions of equality in public education after Brown. The growth of
the state lawmaking machinery-particularly on constitutional issues-
has been unprecedented over the last two decades. Whatever one may
think of the phenomenon of modem state constitutional law in the ab-
stract, it is now clear beyond quibble that these documents have become
the cloth out of which modem social compacts are woven. On matters of
taxation,20 spending,2' crime and punishment,22 the environment,23 and
substantive due process,24 state constitutions are being used to provide a
forum for both discussion and resolution of the major issues of the day.
A closer examination of the capacity of state policymakers to use
these tools to direct the future of public education now seems essential in
the twilight of the Brown era. The inquiry highlights a dire prognosis.
Since Brown, state policymaking on education issues has been unimagina-
tive and reactive. State educational policy generally reflects the fear that
meaningful equality-when defined as merely an equal opportunity to
succeed-is undesirable, too costly, or both. Any movement toward
public school reform is boilerplate, reflecting the spirit, and reluctantly,
the letter of federal law.
25
This Article begins with a summary of federal court decisions on
education after Brown and leading up to Freeman. It concludes that
Supreme Court decisions have led to a way of thinking about educational
equality that has helped reinforce the reluctance of the states to embrace
the equality mandate of Brown while embracing federalist arguments in
20. See Durant v. State Bd. of Educ., 381 N.W.2d 662 (Mich. 1985), enforced sub. nom.
Durant v. Department of Educ., 463 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); see also Huntington
Park Redevelopment Agency v. Martin, 695 P.2d 220 (Cal. 1985) (en bane); Vernon v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 4 Cal. App. 4th 110 (1992); Boone County Ct. v. State, 631 S.W.2d 321
(Mo. 1982) (en bane).
21. See Wein v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1976); Wein v. Carey, 362 N.E.2d 587 (N.Y.
1977).
22. See Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, (1983) (search and seizure); see also Common-
wealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d. 116 (Mass. 1984) (capital punishment).
23. For example, the Massachusetts Constitution states:
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive and
unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic qualities of their
environment; and the protection of the people in their right to the conservation, de-
velopment and utilization of the agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and other
natural resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose.
MAss. CONST., art. 97. See also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1092
(Mass. 1981).
24. See Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib., 206 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 1974) (liberty of con-
tract); see also Department of Ins. v. Dade County Consumer Advocate Office, 492 So. 2d
1032 (Fla. 1986) (liberty to set rates and business practices).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 143-76.
defense of inaction. Thereafter, the focus of the Article shifts to the ac-
tion of state and local policymakers and the history of their responses to
Brown and its call for educational equality.
What emerges is a pattern of avoidance, contradiction, and fear. A
disinclination to take the inequality claims of school-aged plaintiffs seri-
ously combines with an indifference to educational rights that curiously
contradicts the current explosion of state-created individual liberties.
Federalism on noneducational issues is alive and well. States now rou-
tinely forge new ground on individual rights, independent of, and often in
spite of, federal law.26 Few, if any, states approach the subject of educa-
tional equality as though real flexibility in tailoring approaches to local
conflicts exists.2 7 The traditional excuses offered by states when con-
fronted with this anomaly poorly masks what appears to be a belief that
the benefits of educational equality are outweighed by its cost to local
autonomy. This sentiment-the fear of equalizing-succinctly framed
by Jonathan Kozol at the beginning of this article, provides the backdrop
for an examination of Brown in state hands.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 116-42.
27. Two local reform movements, one in Los Angeles, California, the other in Baltimore,
Maryland, are worth mentioning as exceptions to the barren landscape of education reform.
Los Angeles is working with the Los Angeles Educational Alliance for Restructuring Now
(LEARN) Foundation to reform its schools. LEARN is a southern California consortium of
over 600 educators, business people, civic policymakers, and parents. It has taken a multi-task
force approach to producing a reform plan that proposes a restructuring of the Los Angeles
Unified School District. Under the LEARN plan, the District-which is the second largest
school district in the nation-would be broken up. Policymaking and accountability under the
plan is transferred to the local school and its administrators, teachers, and parents. Hiring,
retention, spending, and curriculum matters would be decentralized in the hope of making
schools more responsive and effective to the communities they serve. The LEARN plan may
take effect in 1993. See Perspective on Vouchers: Try 'Choice' among Public Schools Before
Subsidizing Private Schooh; Which Will Shut Out the Vast Majority of Children?, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1992, at B7.
Baltimore has formed a partnership with an outside agency in order to reform its school
system. Education Alternatives, a Minnesota-based group, has taken over a group of schools
in mostly poor sections of the city in hopes of instituting a "for-profit" method of management.
The centerpieces of the reform are "personal educational game plans" which are drawn up for
each student. These plans, devised after a series of parent-teacher meetings, are executed using
more adult classroom supervision--often by recent college graduate volunteers-and relying
heavily on computers and technology to make sure that no student is taught based on some
prior group classification or tracking label. See William Trombley, For-Profit Public Schools
Test is Off to a Mixed Start Education: Private Firm is Running Nine Baltimore Campuses.
Some Teachers Say Little Has Changed, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1992, at Al.
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I. State Policymaking And the Influence of the
Federal Judiciary
It is difficult to account for all of the causes that have led to the
hibernation of state policymaking on educational equality issues, but
some of the components are easy to discern. Ironically, the policies of
the federal government, both in defining the parameters of the Brown
mandate and in implementing the law, contributed greatly to the current
morass. The decisions of the Supreme Court and the domestic policies of
the executive branch have led to a way of thinking about accountability
for educational equality issues that has proven counterproductive.
A. The Desegregation Cases
On the judicial side, this influence began innocently with the Court's
attempt to define the scope of authority of the district courts, whose
judges had assumed control over state educational policy in order to dis-
mantle segregated schools. The increasing use of federal authority had
caused quite a stir among state and local government officials, many of
whom predicted a growing imperialism among the district court judges.
In 1971, the Supreme Court announced its decision in the case
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,28 in order to "re-
view... the scope of powers of federal courts under this Court's man-
dates to eliminate racially separate public schools established and
maintained by state action."2 9 The facts before the Court were rather
typical for the times. Seventeen years after the ruling in Brown v. Board
of Education,30 the schools of this North Carolina town remained virtu-
ally segregated.3 '
The Court in Swann reaffirmed the traditional equity power of the
federal judiciary to remedy violations of the Constitution. Chief Justice
Burger then proceeded to limit its application in public school desegrega-
tion cases. "If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations,"
28. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
29. Id. at 5 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. The Court in Swann found:
During the 1968-1969 school year the system served more than 84,000 pupils in 107
schools. Approximately 71% of the pupils were found to be white and 29% Negro.
As of June 1969 there were approximately 24,000 Negro students in the system, of
whom 21,000 attended schools within the city of Charlotte. Two-thirds of those
21,000, approximately 14,000 Negro students, attended 21 schools which were either
totally Negro or more than 99% Negro.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 6-7.
[Vol. 20:521
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reasoned the Chief Justice, "judicial authority may be invoked. 32
In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this
remedial power extends it is important to remember that judicial
powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional viola-
tion. Remedial judicial authority does not put judges automati-
cally in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are plenary.
Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults....
As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy.33
The framework announced in Swann made sense. It settled norms
for the officials of state public school systems who thereafter could antici-
pate the nature of federal involvement in dismantling segregated schools.
The Swann rules also provided federal district courts with a checklist and
a barometer against which their orders could be reviewed. 34 But the con-
tributions of the Supreme Court to the progress of Brown took an omi-
nous turn in later decisions. A subtle shift in the manner in which the
Court characterized the nature of a violation led to the beginning of the
end of Brown's legal force, and for state and local officials, the end of a
sense of responsibility for addressing educational equality.
Nothing in Swann dictated the decision of the Court in later cases to
define violations of Brown in increasingly narrow terms. District courts
were already looking for segregation attributable to state action, "show-
ing that either the school authorities or some other agency of the State
hald] deliberately attempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect
the racial composition of the schools."3 5 But the Brown jurisprudence
after Swann began to emphasize a decentralized notion of agency that
had the effect of first suggesting, then later encouraging, states to leave
educational policymaking localized and fragmented. 6
Perhaps no case is more important in this regard than Milliken v.
Bradley.37 Milliken utilized the narrow version of agency theory to insu-
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id. at 15-16.
34. After Swann, the remedies checklist was essentially closed. First, "eliminate invidious
racial distinctions .... [Then], take corrective action... with regard to the maintenance of
buildings and the distribution of equipment ... faculty assignment and new school construc-
tion." Id. at 18-19.
35. Id. at 32.
36. As it relates to government entities, the law of agency is based on the notion that the
acts of one agency or instrumentality of a government fall on the government itself when the
former are "so closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be
viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity... is concerned." United States v.
New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982). See Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility
for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. RV. 225 (1986).
37. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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late local subdivisions from accountability for discrimination caused by
the policies of the Michigan State Board of Education. The decision ef-
fectively sanctioned local control and autonomy as defensive mechanisms
to evade responsibility altogether. Later, the decision in Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler" encouraged an extension of the Milliken
non-responsibility rationale through manipulation of the de facto/de jure
dichotomy.39 After these decisions, one clearly sees an emphasis on de-
centralization in school governance and a growing isolation of those in
charge of day-to-day administration of the schools from those with an
interest in formulating long-range policies.
Milliken has been seen by some as the key to this shift in emphasis,
because it occurred at a time when state legislators appeared to be play-
ing an active role in the deliberate resistance to Brown desegregation or-
ders." The Court was faced with reviewing an order of the District
Court (affirmed by the Court of Appeals) that imposed an interdistrict
desegregation remedy on the Michigan State Board of Education. All of
the Justices agreed with the findings of the lower courts (or assumed the
correctness of the findings for purposes of reviewing the order) that sev-
eral acts by the State Board contributed to the pattern of segregation that
existed in the City of Detroit public schools. These actions helped to
create a scheme of metropolitan schools that were segregated with blacks
at the core and whites at the periphery.4 The lower courts approved of a
remedy that would effectively combine fifty-three school districts with
the City of Detroit district to "achieve the greatest degree of actual
38. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
39. De jure segregation ("by law") is that which is tied to intentional acts of government.
De facto segregation ("by the facts") is not attributable to government because it exists outside
of-and often in spite of-the law. The distinction is critical in racial inequality cases. See
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The Court has on occasion cautioned state
and local governments that they should ignore private biases based on race in policymaking or
else risk converting the effects of the bias into a de jure conflict. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984).
40. In 1971, the Supreme Court described the response of the states over the 16-year
period after the decision in Brown II:
Nothing in our national experience prior to 1955 prepared anyone for dealing with
changes and adjustments of the magnitude and complexity encountered since then.
Deliberate resistance of some of the Court's mandates has impeded the good-faith
efforts of others to bring school systems into compliance. The detail and nature of
these dilatory tactics have been noted frequently by this Court and other courts.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
41. Of the 86 school districts in the Detroit metropolitan area, the racial composition was
81% white and 19% black. Within the City of Detroit, the school ratio was 64% black and
34% white with most schools either all-white or all-black. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
765 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
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desegregation." 42
The majority, led by Chief Justice Burger, ruled that the order was
too broad and that, in any event, the remedy should be confined to the
area where the segregation actually occurred-the Detroit City school
system. The Court reasoned:
[O]ur assumption ... that state agencies did participate in the
maintenance of the Detroit system, should make it clear that it is
not on this point that we part company. The difference between
[the majority and the dissenters] arises instead from established
doctrine laid down by our cases. [These cases] addressed the issue
of constitutional wrong in terms of an established geographic and
administrative school system ....
The result in Milliken-that the remedy should be limited to the
Detroit City public schools-was a blow to proponents favoring a more
integrated society after Brown. The decision also redirected much of the
jurisprudence. After Brown II, the primary obligation to provide a rem-
edy for unlawful segregation in schools rested with federal courts. The
judges-primarily district court judges-were supposed to fashion de-
crees relying on the traditional equity power of the federal judiciary. The
Court in Brown II noted that "[i]n fashioning and effectuating the de-
crees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally,
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its rem-
edies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs."'
The position of the Milliken majority (the Justices split 5-4) was
thus difficult to justify. It offered a stunted version of judicial authority
after a constitutional violation had been found because of the potentially
disruptive effect multi-district orders might have on state educational op-
erations.45 Justice Burger wrote:
No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than
local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the
educational process.... [A] review of the scope and character of
these local powers indicates the extent to which the interdistrict
remedy approved by the two courts could disrupt and alter the
42. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 734 (1974) (citing Bradley v. Miliken, 345 F. Supp.
914, 918 (E.D. Mich. 1972)).
43. Id at 746 (emphasis added).
44. 349 U.S. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
45. See Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken: The View
Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535; Leonard P. Strickman, School Desegregation
at the Crossroads, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 725 (1975).
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structure of public education in Michigan.
46
The Milliken majority's preference for a remedy defined in geo-
graphic rather than organizational terms created a natural defense for
state school officials. Most of the minorities affected by the vestiges of
segregation, then, as now, lived in urban areas. Under Milliken, there-
fore, the suburban school districts-the beneficiaries of segregation in
housing and prior state educational polices-were now "independent"
and insulated from remedial action except in the highly unlikely event
that state action created interdistrict segregation. Justice White, one of
the four dissenters, noted:
The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation
and their consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy
would be infeasible or unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria
governing school desegregation cases, but because an effective rem-
edy would cause what the Court considers to be undue administra-
tive inconvenience to the State. The result is that the State of
Michigan, the entity at which the Fourteenth Amendment is di-
rected, has successfully insulated itself from its duty to provide ef-
fective desegregation remedies by vesting sufficient power over its
public schools in its local school districts. If this is the case in
Michigan, it will be the case in most States.47
After Milliken, the Supreme Court began a pattern of issuing rulings
that effectively narrowed the equity powers of federal district court
judges as to both the breadth of desegregation orders as well as the scope
of discretion by which these judges would evaluate compliance with the
orders.
The decision in Spangler's is in the latter category. In Spangler, the
Court reversed the ruling of the district and circuit courts that continued
the supervision of the district court on pupil assignments in the Pasadena
School District. The district court based its decision, in part, on "a 3-
year pattern of opposition by a number of the members of the Board of
Education to both the spirit and letter" of the desegregation plan.49 This
finding served as a counterpoint to the fact that the school district had
achieved the pupil assignment goals set in the plan during the first year.
Thereafter, the pupil assignment goal, that there be no school in the dis-
trict with a majority of any minority students, was not met. Goals set in
other areas, including hiring and promoting teachers and administrators,
were also not met.
46. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742-43.
47. Id at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
48. Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
49. Id. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Spangler Court, however, decided that the initial year of com-
pliance with the goal justified restriction on the equity powers of the
court. The key to the Court's logic was the fact that the shift away from
the pupil attendance goals "resulted from people randomly moving into,
out of, and around the PUSD [Pasadena Unified School District] area."
' 0
The Court ruled that one year of compliance was enough to take the
issue of pupil assignments out of the remedial authority of the courts.
"For having once implemented a racially neutral attendance pattern in
order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the part of the
defendants, the District Court had fully performed its fimetion .... ,51
An observer of these events might well have concluded that the
Supreme Court had simply changed its jurisprudence to fit its conclusion
that busing, the most common remedy at the time, was not desirable as a
solution to educational equality problems arising from racial classifica-
tions. After Swann, Milliken, and Spangler, federal district courts were
hard pressed to fashion effective desegregation plans. Demographic
changes, combined with the reorganization of state educational systems
into literally hundreds of local and independent school districts, left
judges tinkering with remedies in school districts that were mostly mi-
nority and primarily poor.52
The effect of this shift in interpreting the requirements of Brown also
profoundly affected state authority over educational policy. The state's
accountability for public education survived as a concept, but with
blurred contours. The concept became almost irrelevant for purposes of
remedying educational inequality. It still influences the drawing of
boundaries of school districts and participates in school site selection.
State legislatures still maintain and support the educational system under
the general supervision of the state board of education.53 Construction of
schools is still accomplished through municipal bonds controlled by state
50. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 435-36.
51. Id at 436-37.
52. See generally Sedler, supra note 45. Professor Sedler notes:
Stated simply, the problem of metropolitan desegregation results from placing the
responsibility for public education in local school districts, which are often organized
along urban-suburban lines. Because the blacks in most metropolitan areas are con-
centrated in the central cities and seldom reside in the suburban areas, an urban
school district will necessarily have a high percentage of blacks while suburban dis-
tricts will be substantially white in composition.... Experience indicates that such
desegregation accelerates the general movement of middle-class white to the subur-
ban school districts so that the urban district soon becomes resegregated, blacker and
poorer than before.
Id. at 538.
53. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 758 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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agencies, and some portion of funding for each independent district
comes from the state.
It was no surprise then that the Court in Freeman v. Pitts would
continue this trend by emphasizing that "[as] the de jure violation be-
comes more remote in time and these demographic changes intervene, it
becomes less likely that a current racial imbalance in a school district is a
vestige of the prior dejure system."54
B. Education as a Fundamental Right
The theme of anti-accountability represents only one part of the fed-
eral judicial contribution to state thinking on educational issues. The
other component involves the attitude of the Supreme Court on the role
of education in a democracy.
During the period in which Swann, Milliken, and Spangler were de-
cided, the uncertainty about the legal status of educational issues went
beyond the desegregation cases. There was considerable discussion about
the notion that access to education should be part of the newly emerging
list of fundamental rights, deeply rooted in our tradition and part of the
American scheme of ordered "liberty" under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Much of the post-World War II activities of the Court has involved
the discovery and announcement of the scope of protection for individu-
als to engage in activities deemed fundamental. The right to marry, the
right to establish a home and raise and educate children, and the right to
travel previously have been found fundamental, although a textual
source for the rights has "proven elusive."55 The rights to familial, mari-
tal, and individual privacy were added to the list of fundamental rights
with a stir of controversy over the scope of the limitation placed on gov-
ernment power to regulate lifestyle choices.56
It was not until 1973-two years after the decision in Swann and
one year before the Milliken ruling-that the Supreme Court squarely
faced the issue of whether education had a place under the rubric of im-
plied rights. In the case of San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,5 7 the Court considered whether the school financing laws of
the State of Texas violated the Constitution.
54. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1448 (1992).
55. Attorney Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902 (1986); see also Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex reL Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
56. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
57. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Jonathan Kozol, in his study of educational policy, described the
disparity that led to the lawsuit:
A class action suit had been filed in 1968 by a resident of San
Antonio named Demetrio Rodriguez and other parents on behalf
of their own children, who were students in the city's Edgewood
district, which was very poor and 96% nonwhite. Although
Edgewood residents paid one of the highest tax rates in the area,
the district could raise only $37 for each pupil. Even with the
"minimum" provided by the state, Edgewood ended up with only
$231 for each child. Alamo Heights, meanwhile, the richest dis-
trict, was able to raise $421 for each student from a lower tax rate
and, because it got state aid (and federal aid), was able to spend
$543 on each pupil. Alamo Heights, then as now, was a predomi-
nantly white district.
The difference between spending levels in these districts was,
moreover, not the widest differential to be found in Texas. A sam-
ple of 110 Texas districts at the time showed that the ten wealthiest
districts spent an average of three times as much per pupil as the
four poorest districts, even with the funds provided under the
state's "equalizing" formula.5"
The Supreme Court in Rodriguez upheld the state school-financing
scheme. The Court refused to declare education fundamental, reasoning
that "[i]t is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws."59
In a 5-4 decision the Court ruled that "to the extent that the Texas sys-
tem of school financing results in unequal expenditures between children
who happen to reside in different districts, we cannot say that such dis-
parities are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidi-
ously discriminatory."'
In rendering this decision, the Court set in motion a way of thinking
about educational policy that continues to influence state policymaking.
The Court dismissed two alternative methods of viewing the state's obli-
gations to equalize educational opportunity that would have raised the
constitutional status of education. Fundamental right status for educa-
tion was rejected because of the difficulty in articulating the new stan-
dard of review. The majority worried:
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of educa-
tion is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful
exercise of [speech and of full participation in the political process],
we have no indication that the present levels of educational ex-
58. KOZOL, supra note 2, at 214. The dollar figure presented in this narrative are 1968
dollars not adjusted for inflation.
59. Rodiguez 411 U.S. at 33.
60. Id. at 54-55.
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penditures in Texas provide an education that falls short.
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financ-
ing system occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportuni-
ties to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for
finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative
differences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in
the present case-no charge fairly could be made that the system
fails to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the rights ... 61
The Edgewood parents also presented the Court with an argument
based on fundamental fairness, asking the Justices to treat the poor chil-
dren of the Edgewood School District as a suspect class for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause. Yet the Court ruled that "the Texas system
does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class."'62 To
reach this conclusion, the Court had to sidestep the strong logic supplied
by the facts of the educational disparity. "Disadvantage" is forbidden
under the Equal Protection Clause when it is inflicted on classes of per-
sons that meet preset criteria. The protected class must be identifiable by
discrete characteristics and "subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerless-
ness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process."63
The Rodriguez Court declined to recognize the poor as a protected
class. Economic disadvantage would remain outside the equal protection
equation, unless perhaps keyed to a long-term denial of access to
majoritarian political processes. As a result, disparate impact standing
alone means little to the equal protection analysis."4 Laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of insignificant factors are presumed valid if they have a
rational relationship to a permissible state objective-a judicial test that
almost no law fails.65
61. Id. at 36-37.
62. Id. at 28.
63. Id.
64. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
65. In Harris the Court enunciated the standard:
The guarantee of equal protection... is not a source of substantive rights or liberties,
but rather a right to be free from invidious discrimination in statutory classifications
and other governmental activity. It is well settled that where a statutory classifica-
tion does not itself impinge on a right or liberty protected by the Constitution, the
validity of classification must be sustained unless "the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of [any legitimate governmental] objective."
This presumption of constitutional validity, however, disappears if a statutory classi-
fication is predicated on criteria that are, in a constitutional sense, 'suspect,' the prin-
cipal example of which is a classification based on race ....
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (citations and footnote omitted).
The federal judiciary thus lent its imprimatur to a way of thinking
about educational equality that catered to the reluctance of the states to
include the mandate of Brown in their policymaking calculus. The
message is far from subtle: education is not a fundamental right. Even if
there were a right to an education, no particular level of education would
be guaranteed. Therefore, as long as states do not use prohibited classifi-
cations or completely deny access to public education, their programs
will pass constitutional muster. Racial classifications will trigger stricter
scrutiny by the courts, but even then, remedies will be limited in time and
geographic area by the doctrine of state action.
II. State Policymaking and the Influence of the Congress and
the President
In addition to the case law spawned by the judiciary, congressional
and executive branch policies also have had an effect on the way in which
state policymakers view their obligations toward education policy.
A. The Civil Rights Years
As a direct result of the Brown ruling, the federal government,
through legislation and judicial actions, worked to secure equal educa-
tional opportunities for blacks on a nationwide basis. Among the actions
taken were 1) the defeat of proposals for federal aid to education that
would have strengthened the dual school system; and 2) the insertion of
nondiscrimination clauses by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) in contracts with colleges participating in National De-
fense Education Act programs.66 In addition to federal action, and per-
haps most importantly, black organizations and white liberals began to
organize and work together in ways that forced confrontations with
southern political leadership. Ultimately these challenges to the status
quo lead to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.67 In 1965 the primary purpose of
federal financial assistance shifted from helping schools in general to im-
plementing a remedy for failure to provide equal educational opportunity
to black children.68 This shift was the result of the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act of 1965 and the issuance of enforcement guide-
lines for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Moreover, the Civil
66. DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW 481 (3d ed. 1992).
67. Id.
68. Yet on a local level, resistance grew as federal guidelines mandated more actual deseg-
regation. Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, Symposium Civil Rights and Federalism: New
Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1243, 1246-48 (1984).
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Rights Act empowered HEW to withhold federal funds from school dis-
tricts that discriminated against blacks.69 HEW also implemented earlier
reform proposals granting the Attorney General the authority to file de-
segregation suits against local school boards that engaged in segregation
upon the complaints of private citizens.7 °
By the end of the 1960s, however, the doors of federal support for
desegregation began to close. Resistance by state and local officials and
discomfort on the part of a Republican-controlled Congress mounted as
HEW heightened its demands for desegregation. By the third year of
Title VI's enforcement, the guidelines were frozen.71 Moreover, congres-
sional efforts to limit HEW's enforcement of Title VI finally resulted in
language that significantly decreased HEW's authority.72
B. The Nixon Years
The Nixon Administration, which tapped into the widespread anti-
busing sentiment, began distancing itself from the directives of the
Supreme Court.7 3 On July 3, 1969, the Department of Justice and HEW
jointly announced that strict compliance with timetables for integration
would be dropped: "A policy requiring all school districts, regardless of
the difficulties they face, to complete desegregation by the same terminal
date is too rigid to be either workable or equitable."'74 This joint state-
ment was interpreted by most observers as signifying a slowdown of
school integration.75
The Administration filed a motion to delay desegregation with the
Supreme Court.76 When this motion was denied, Nixon stated that the
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964).
70. KIRP, supra note 66, at 481.
71. Devins & Stedman, supra note 68, at 1249.
72. THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 81-82 (1991).
73. Some suggest that from the 1950s to the mid-1960s, school desegregation did not
affect northern whites or affluent southern whites in the suburbs of larger cities. It was not
until school desegregation threatened to reach their schools, that they became aroused in oppo-
sition. Initially, desegregation affected southern and working class whites; gradually, middle-
level white groups in the North and West and in the suburbs of the South became involved.
When this occurred, opinion polls showed a huge majority of middle-level whites opposed to
busing beyond the nearest school as a means of promoting school desegregation. Finally, in
the late 1960s, large-scale white protests in the North and West began to appear. SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION: A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE 42 (Walter G. Stephan & Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980).
74. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 72, at 81.
75. HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR. & CHARLES S. BULLOCK III, LAW AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 89-90 (1972).
76. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 72, at 82. The Supreme Court rejected the Adminis-
tration's request for a one-year delay of school integration in southern school districts and
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law would be carried out, "but stressed that he did 'not feel obligated to
do any more than the minimum the law required,' and he made clear that
he 'disagreed' with the Court."' 77 He defined forced desegregation as the
responsibility of the courts and not of his administration. 78 So while the
federal courts mandated that desegregation take place, the federal gov-
ernment did not support the Court's directives.79
Despite the Administration's stand, it should be recognized that the
Administration did not prevent desegregation. The wheels of desegrega-
tion had gained sufficient momentum before the Administration had an
opportunity to employ its strategy. By 1968, the percentage of black
children in all-black schools in the South had dropped from ninety-eight
percent to twenty-five percent.8 0 Moreover, the Administration's policies
did not go unchallenged. Civil rights groups charged that the Adminis-
tration had relaxed its standards with respect to school desegregation by
refusing to threaten or employ the ultimate sanction of a cutoff of federal
funds in noncomplying districts.81 Suit was filed against the Secretary of
HEW, and HEW was ordered by the court to take "appropriate action to
end segregation in public educational institutions receiving federal
funds." 82
Furthermore, the Administration and Congress took actions which
weakened busing in some instances and maintained busing in others.
While Congress rejected an Administration proposal that would have ef-
fectively banned busing for integration below the seventh grade, it did
enact a busing moratorium as part of the Education Amendments of
1972.83 Similarly, Congress once again limited busing in the Equal Edu-
cational Opportunities Act of 1974 (the Esch Amendment). The Act in-
dicated that "no court of the United States shall order the
implementation of any plan to remedy a finding of de jure segregation
which involves the transportation of students, unless the court first finds
that all alternative remedies are inadequate."84 Moreover, when busing
was ordered, no student could be bused beyond the school next closest to
his home, unless the courts determined that more extensive busing was
ordered the immediate integration of previously de jure school districts. Alexander v. Homes
County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
77. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 72, at 82.
78. Id.
79. ia
80. Devins & Stedman, supra note 68, at 1251.
81. KIRP, supra note 66, at 558.
82. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
83. KIRP, supra note 66, at 558.
84. 20 U.S.C § 1755 (1988).
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needed to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.85 An amend-
ment to the Labor-HEW appropriations bill for fiscal 1976 (the Byrd
Amendment) prohibited HEW from using funds, either directly or indi-
rectly, to force a school district to transport a student beyond the school
nearest his home for reasons of race.8 6 Later appropriations acts carried
the same restrictions.8 7
The Eagelton-Biden Amendment in 1977 modified the Byrd
Amendment prohibiting the use of HEW funds to require busing to im-
plement desegregation plans that involved the pairing, clustering, or re-
organizing the grade structure of schools. 8  This modification was
carried forward in future appropriations acts. 89
In support of busing, the Nixon Administration and Congress con-
tinued to give direct financial assistance to help school districts through-
out the country implement desegregation plans. In 1970, Nixon called
for federal funds to assist "school districts in meeting special problems
incident to court-ordered desegregation."90 He requested $500 million
for the Emergency School Aid Act of 1970 (ESAA) in fiscal year 1971
and $1 billion in 1972. These funds were directed to supporting desegre-
gation plans at schools around the country. Between fiscal year 1973 and
fiscal year 1981, $2.2 billion was provided to "desegregating school dis-
tricts under ESAA for staff training, additional staff, new curriculum de-
velopment, community relations activities, and in its final years, the
financing of magnet schools."91 In its last two years, ESAA focused on
activities directly related to the implementation of desegregation plans
and on those districts most recently adopting desegregation plans, rather
85. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1714, 1718 (1988).
86. KiRP, supra note 66, at 558.
87. Id.
88. Iad The Eagleton-Biden Amendment has been attached to every piece of HEW or
Department of Education appropriations legislation since 1977 and reads as follows:
None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to require, directly or indi-
rectly, the transportation of any student to a school other than the school which is
nearest the student's home, except for a student requiring special education, in order
to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For the purpose of this
section an indirect requirement of transportation of student includes the transporta-
tion of students to carry out a plan involving the reorganization of the grade struc-
ture of schools, the pairing of schools, or the clustering of schools, or any
combination of grade restructuring, pairing, or clustering. The prohibition in this
section does not include the establishment of magnet schools.
Pub. L. No. 98-139, § 306, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (1992).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1992).
90. Statement About Desegregation of Elementary and Secondary Schools, 1970 PuB. PA-
PEas 304, 317 (Mar. 24, 1970).
91. Devins & Stedman, supra note 68, at 1252.
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than on compensatory education.92 On the down side, ESAA's pre-grant
review process allowed many schools which were ineligible for funds be-
cause of violations of the program's anti-discrimination provisions to ob-
tain waivers by agreeing to take specific remedial desegregation actions.93
C. Post-Nixon: Chain Reaction
During the Carter Administration, Congress modified ESAA by
passing the Education Amendments of 1978 in response to criticism that
ESAA was unduly funding old desegregation plans and that its funds
were used excessively for compensatory education. However, the ESAA
remained an important source of federal funding for school desegrega-
tion, with annual appropriations exceeding $300 million in some years.94
The Reagan Administration reevaluated the federal government's
role in education, especially federal efforts to secure equal educational
opportunities for all students.95 Prior to the Reagan Administration, fed-
eral executive and legislative policy of the 1960s and 1970s had been to
subordinate local control of education to the pursuit of the national goal
of equal educational opportunity. 96 During this time the federal govern-
ment did not trust the local school districts' willingness or ability to ad-
dress the needs and concerns of minority students. This federal policy
led to an antagonistic relationship between the federal government and
local school systems. 97 Once President Reagan took office, he set out to
return to a more amiable relationship between the federal government
and the local school districts. He vowed to put control back into local
hands.98
92. "Compensatory education" meant those programs (new curriculum development,
community relations) intended to bring schools, students, and communities that had previ-
ously suffered as a result of segregation and "separate and unequal" conditions up to speed
with those schools, students, and communities that had not been so disadvantaged. ESAA
funds were not to be used for student transportation, nor to supplant state or local funds. Id.
at 1253.
93. "One measure of the effectiveness of the pre-grant review was the extent to which
ineligible districts secured waivers. Between fiscal year 1975 and fiscal year 1981, of the 731
districts declared ineligible, ... 502 or sixty nine percent secured waivers." Id.
94. Id. at 1254.
95. Id. at 1254-55. A February 1981 Gallup poll reflected the continuing popular opposi-
tion to forced busing. This "survey show[ed] opinion among whites 4-to-1 in opposition to
busing. Blacks however, [were] 2-to-i in favor of this means of achieving better racial balance
in the schools." Neal Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980"s- The Courts' Abandon-
ment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 7, 8 n.1 (1984) (citing
Gallup, Whites, Blacks in Sharp Disagreement on Busing, at 1 (Feb. 5, 1981)).
96. Devins & Stedman, supra note 68, at 1252.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1254.
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In 1981, the administration issued "America's New Beginning: A
Program for Economic Recovery," a list of proposed changes to:
federal programs to reduce federal expenditures and the federal
presence in many areas of domestic life.... For elementary and
secondary education, it called for consolidating forty-five federal
programs in order to "shift control over education policy away
from the Federal Government and back to State and local authori-
ties-where it constitutionally and historically belongs.99
The administration also requested a cut of $59.3 million in fiscal year
1981 from ESAA funds. "In 1981, categorical aid designed to encourage
the adoption of federally-approved school desegregation programs was
eliminated along with other categorical aid programs. These programs
were replaced by a block grant of federal funds which local school sys-
tems could spend to suit their own preferences.""
This approach presumed that federal, state, and local policy goals
were in harmony with each other.' 0 ' Again, this was a departure from
the previous twenty years of the federal, state, and local relationship. In
essence, the local schools now had to decide between spending limited
federal funds on busing programs or buying much needed supplies and
hiring additional teachers. The Administration was forcing local dis-
tricts to choose between funding needs, whereas before, even though
there had been distrust by the federal government, there were also
enough funds to allow school districts to both fund desegregation and
buy what was needed. During the Reagan Administration, school dis-
tricts were asked, under the guise of renewed local control, to sacrifice
one or the other. With opposition to busing widespread and the need to
apply federal monies to teachers and supplies urgent, busing programs
were the obvious choice for sacrifice.
Between 1982 and 1989, the federal government's share of the edu-
cation dollar declined from seven and a half cents to just over six
cents.'0 2 Among the nation's largest school districts, those with ESAA
99. Id (citing WHIrrE HousE, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING: A PROGRAM FOR ECO-
NOMIC RECOVERY 7-1 (1981)).
100. Devins & Stedman, supra note 68, at 1244.
101. Id
102. David S. Broder, Report Cards from the Governors, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1990, at
A19. According to Kevin Phillips:
Under Reagan, Federal budget policy, like tax changes, became a factor in the re-
alignment of wealth, especially after the 1981-82 recession sent the deficit soaring.
The slack was made up by money borrowed at home and abroad at high cost. The
first effect lay in who received more Government funds. Republican constituencies -
military producers and installations, agribusiness, bondholders and the elderly
clearly benefited, while decreases in social programs hurt Democratic interests and
constituencies: the poor, big cities, subsidized housing, education.
[Vol. 20:521
grants of over $1 million in fiscal year 1981 lost between six and seventy-
nine percent of their previous federal funding in that year under the
block grant.
10 3
Additionally, the Reagan Administration actively worked to reduce
busing litigation. The Justice Department began to settle many, if not
most, of the cases it brought (and it brought fewer cases than past admin-
istrations) by consent decree."° This process left the plaintiffs out of the
settlement, often denying them an actual remedy, and actually resulted in
limiting desegregation. Problems inherent in this closed process were
demonstrated in the administration's first elementary school desegrega-
tion suit, initiated against the school board of Bakersfield, California.1 5
The Department of Education had found that the schools of Bakersfield
were segregated by law. Minority children were actually bused across
town to attend segregated schools. Pursuant to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Education Department referred the case to the
Justice Department for action.10 6 On the same day the Justice Depart-
ment filed a complaint initiating suit, it also filed a consent decree ending
the suit. The decree was signed the same day by United States District
Judge Edward Price without a hearing.
107
The Bakersfield decree was an exceptionally weak settlement,
merely requiring that a series of magnet schools be established to induce
voluntary transfers and thus desegregation.108 It provided for dismissal
of the claim against Bakersfield and termination of court involvement
after three years, regardless of whether actual progress was made toward
integration of the city's schools. When the Bakersfield decree is com-
pared with settlements achieved in other desegregation cases brought by
parties other than the federal government during the same period, it be-
comes clear that the decree embodied a weaker remedy than was legally
obtainable and weaker than parents and students may have wanted.
Even the administrative law judge who originally heard the Bakersfield
Kevin P. Phillips, A Capital Offense: Reagan's America, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1990, (Maga-
zine), at 26 (emphasis added).
103. Devins & Stedman, supra note 68, at 1256.
104. Randolph D. Moss, Note, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegrega-
tion Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1814 (1986).
105. Id. at 1812.
106. Id. (citing N.Y TIMES, Feb. 12, 1984, at A28).
107. Id.
108. Id. The creation of a magnet school was not a new remedy, the difference here was
the failure to require any progress as a result of the program being instituted. In fact, magnet
school programs have been heralded in many situations for beginning as an attempt to inte-
grate and ultimately providing superior education for all students who attend them. Troy
Segal et al., Saving Our Schools, Bus. WK., Sept. 14, 1992, at 70.
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case called the decree weak. 1 9
Bakersfield was not unique. In fact, the Justice Department at the
time called the Bakersfield decree "the blueprint for desegregation in this
Country" and entered similar settlements in a number of other cities. 110
The Bush Administration followed in the footsteps of its predecessor
in that it maintained block grants and did not attempt to reestablish a
separate program to encourage desegregation. Furthermore, President
Bush proposed a new direction: school choice. The President presented
Congress with America 2000, his program for educational reform. The
plan called for all students to attend the school of their choice., In
doing this, the apparent assumption was that there would be no need for
funding desegregation programs if all parents were choosing their chil-
dren's schools.112 On the one hand, natural integration would occur, and
on the other, once the states had given parents the power to choose their
children's schools, the states could not step in and relocate the children
to achieve racial diversity. 3
This policy also suggests that the allocation of resources for public
education would be shaped by the competition created by parental
choice. In this way, much of educational policy would become a part of
microeconomic theory in which educators respond to the demands cre-
109. Moss, supra note 104, at 1812 n.11 (citing N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 12, 1984, at A28).
110. Id. at 1814.
111. On April 18, 1991, President Bush unveiled his strategy for improving education.
White House Fact Sheet on the President's Education Strategy, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
468, 468 Apr. 18, 1991. America 2000 received mixed reviews from educators throughout the
country. The program would give $1000 apiece to 500,000 children from low and middle-
income families in 50 communities to help them pay for private or public education and would
create 535 new schools. Id. at 470. The program was criticized by Albert Shanker, President
of the American Federation of Teachers, for lacking adequate funding, being shortsighted, and
not addressing the real problems facing the nation's schools.
112. When asked about the goal of racial integration in this country and America 2000's
dependence on school choice, Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander assured television
viewers that:
[T]he federal civil rights laws would continue to apply as they have in every single
choice plan that's been adopted in America. There's no problem with that. In Mem-
phis, where there have been optional choice schools for the last 10 or 12 years, that
has actually reduced the amount of crosstown busing and that money has been used
for academic programs.
This Week With David Brinkley (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 21, 1991). What Secretary
Alexander was not asked, and did not address is whether the reduction in busing had also
resulted in resegregation in Memphis schools or other states where choice had been employed.
113. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AMERICA 2000 - AN EDUCATION STRATEGY:
SOURCEBOOK (1991); see also, Richard Daugherty, Choice Initiatives: Historical Perspectives on
the Issue, 71 W. EDUC. L. REP. 585 (1992); Paul Gerwitz, Choice in The Transition: School
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728 (1986); Julie K. Underwood,
Commentary: Choice Is Not A Panacea, 71 W. EDUC. L. REp. 599 (1992).
ated by the dominant sector of the educational marketplace. Any resem-
blance between this model of public education and one which emphasizes
protection against majoritarian abuses would be accidental. Kozol asks:
What reason have the black and very poor to lend their credence to
a market system that has proved so obdurate and resistant to their
pleas at every turn? Placing the burden on the individual to break
down doors in finding better education for a child is attractive to
conservatives because it reafirms their faith in individual ambition
and autonomy. But to ask an individual to break down doors that
we have chained and bolted in advance is unfair.' 14
Federal legislative and executive policies have had the effect of de-
emphasizing the equality notion of Brown while reinforcing federalism
concerns. What began as a response to anti-busing sentiment has given
way to policies that have sought to delay integration, place moratoriums
on mandates for equality, and finally to hasten the return of local control
over educational policy by discouraging litigation and eliminating federal
funding.
m. State Policymaking and Local Control:
The Anti-Liberty Myth
Of course, the states have done well, without regard for federal in-
fluence, in resisting the legal and moral implications of Brown on educa-
tional policy. At one level, it seems that the promise by state
polieymakers of the 1950s and 1960s to resist Brown tooth and nail has,
in some sense, come to fruition as the largest factor in the current ten-
dency to write off the Brown jurisprudence as the by-product of a bygone
era.' 5 Yet, on another level and after forty years of desegregation deci-
sions, it appears that the zealous resistance has given way to an implausi-
ble indifference to educational equality matters. The implications of this
indifference on one's view of state policymaking are relatively easy to
highlight through a brief review of modem federalism. The picture pro-
vided by a look at the sovereign of the 1990s suggests that the future of
Brown in State hands is uncharitably bleak: states are not unable to re-
spond to what remains of the Brown legacy, but that states are unwilling
to do so.
114. KOZOL, supra note 2, at 62.
115. In one instance in 1956, 96 congressmen from the South issued a manifesto promising
to use "all lawful means" to maintain segregation. David Kirp notes that between 1954 and
1964 very little desegregation took place. He concludes that "[tihe myriad new pupil assign-
ment laws, 'interposition' plans, and other ingenious schemes demonstrated the truth of the
popular saying, 'as long as we can legislate, we can segregate.'" KIRP, supra note 66, at 479.
See generally Daniel J. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public
Schools, 45 VA. L. RPv. 517 (1959).
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A. The Expansion of State-Created Rights
Despite the enormous growth and influence of federal policy over
the last four decades,' 1 6 states have not become mere spectators. State
policymaking power, unlike that of the Congress, does not depend on
enumeration for its vitality and thus is not limited by the grant of powers
contained in a constitution.1 7 This distinction in the nature of the sover-
eign, more so than issues of the Tenth Amendment or states' rights, al-
lows states to carve out independent jurisprudence on matters of
individual rights that go beyond the federal framework." 8
Placing internal limits on state power by creating individual rights is
thus a more significant event than many perceive. State law enjoys a
presumption of validity not shared by its federal counterpart. State
courts routinely resolve doubts that arise as to the validity of legislation
in favor of the law unless the state-created individual right is defined with
clarity and precision. "' When legislators carve out rights that effectively
impose limitations on state power, they are pursuing a policy interest of
the highest order. The last two decades suggest that a great deal of carv-
ing has occurred.
The reluctance by states to embrace Brown has coexisted with an
explosion in state policymaking through the creation of rights. If one
turns away from education law for a moment to consider the larger pic-
ture, it becomes clear that the state policy machine is alive and wel.
There has been a marked willingness to address and resolve a variety of
autonomy and fairness issues using the tools available to a sovereign.
State constitutions have declared new rights, legislation has assumed
responsibility in areas where traditional immunities previously existed,
and state judicial opinions have reached decisions providing a greater
level of constitutional protection than the federal constitution. Justice
116. For recent line of cases on what remains of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, see New
York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991);
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
117. For a general overview of state power in this regard, see W. F. Dodd, The Function of
a State Constitution, 30 POL. Sci. Q. 201 (1915); Frank P. Grad, The State Constitution: Its
Function and Form in Our Time, 54 VA. L. Rnv. 928 (1968).
118. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: Revival of State Consti-
tutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
Cf. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet-Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988).
119. "It is fundamental that our state constitution limits rather than confers powers.
Where the constitutionality of a statute is involved, the question presented is, therefore, not
whether the act is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby." State
ex rel. Schneider v. Kennedy, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (Kan. 1978).
William Brennan has called the trend toward expansion of individual lib-
erties in the states "the most important development on constitutional
jurisprudence in our times." 120
The list of subjects addressed in this movement is diverse. The right
to privacy has been expressly constitutionalized.12 The right to sue the
owner of a motor vehicle for injuries sustained while a guest or invitee
has been broadened by applying higher standards of rationality under
state equal protection laws. 122 The right to resist searches and seizures
has been expanded, even when the search occurs as an incident to a law-
ful arrest.123 Rights guaranteed under state due process laws have been
expanded to require that pretrial detainees in custody be allowed contact
visitation.124 State law has even been construed to require state Medicaid
funding for abortions despite the rejection of this proposition under the
federal Constitution in Harris v. McRae.1 25 And of course, a few states
have relied on federalism to make education a fundamental right.
126
120. Ronald K.L. Collins, Looking to the States, NA'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1986 (Special Sec-
tion), at S2. It is true that most of Justice Brennan's remarks in this regard focus solely on the
judicial element in the state policy movement, but it is likely that his approving remarks would
embrace any effort by a state to consider the expansion of individual liberties beyond the fed-
eral benchmark.
121. The following 10 states expressly provide a right of privacy in their constitutions:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina,
and Washington. See ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 22; ARuz. CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 7; ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6,
12; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MoNT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 10; WASH.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
122. Beirkamp v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1980) (en banc) ("The result reached
by the United States Supreme Court in construing the federal constitution is persuasive, but
not binding upon the court in construing analogous provisions in our state constitution.").
123. For example, Massachusetts law provides:
A search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for the purposes of
seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime for
which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or concealment;
and removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this
paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.
MASs. GEN. L. ch. 276, § 1 (1992). Compare this with the federal standard found in United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Robinson, in which the Court held that a search
incident to an arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is an exception to Fourth Amend-
ment protections and requires no additional justification, is rejected by several states. See State
v. Brandimart, 720 P.2d 1009 (Haw. 1986); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61 (N.Y. 1989); State
v. Ringer, 674 P.2d 1240 (Wash. 1983), overruled by State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436 (Wash.
1986).
124. See Cooper v. Morin, 399 N.E.2d 1188 (N.Y. 1979).
125. See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982). Cf Harris v. McRae
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
126. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1). For other states, see infra
note 128.
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Standing alone, this rediscovery of state-created rights is one of the
most important developments in late twentieth century constitutionalism
and federalism. When placed alongside the demise of Brown and the per-
sistent failure of states to eliminate inequalities in education, it highlights
an almost inexplicable anomaly.
Initially, one is drawn to the body of decisions by state courts and
legislatures that have repudiated notions of equality in education in spe-
cific contexts. References to school finance, busing, access to educational
services, and desegregation frequently appear accompanied by a bulky
footnote revealing the long list of states that have disavowed equality in
education."2 This list is countered by one which reveals states that are
promoting polices consistent with the Brown jurisprudence.12 8 But the
accomplishments of the states on noneducational issues is formidable in
contrast to the confusing mosaic represented by the education cases.
For example, the state of Alaska has expanded protection for indi-
vidual rights in certain areas far beyond the minimum standard set by the
federal Constitution. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks,129 the courts ex-
panded the right to trial by jury to apply to almost any state prosecution.
In Baker, the court held that a defendant accused of violating a local
ordinance was entitled to a jury trial. In doing so, the court noted:
[W]e recognize that this result has not been reached in certain
other jurisdictions or by the United States Supreme Court. The
mere fact, however, that the United States Supreme Court has not
extended the right to jury trial to all types of offenses does not
preclude us from acting in this field.... [W]e are free, and we are
under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and privi-
leges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental
rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit of our
127. For decisions finding that education is not a fundamental right, see McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Levy v. City of New York, 345 N.E. 2d 556 (N.Y.), appeal
dismissed for want offederal question, 429 U.S. 805 (1976); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d
711 (Mich. 1973).
128. For decisions finding that its state constitution does create a fundamental right in
education, see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Alma School Dist. No. 30 v.
Dupree, No. 77-406 (Ch. Ct., Pulaski City., Ark., Oct. 26, 1981); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d
929 (Cal. 1976) (en bane) (Serrano I1), cert denied, 432 U.S. 907, (1977); Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976); Somerset
County Bd. of Educ. v. Hornbeck, No. A-58438 (Cir. Ct., Baltimore, Md., May 19, 1981);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cerL denied sub nor, Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
976 (1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en bane); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (W. Va. 1979); Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976);
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 824, (1980).
129. 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970).
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local constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of
civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our consti-
tutional heritage.
131
The Constitution of the State of Arizona has been construed many
times to provide a greater level of protection for individual rights than
the federal Constitution. In State v. Ault,13 1 the court held that the pro-
tection given criminal defendants from unlawful searches and seizures
was more exacting than the federal standard so that a warrantless search
of a defendant's home could not be justified by the inevitable discovery
doctrine. The court reasoned that:
our decision not to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into
defendant's home in this case is based on a violation of art. 2 § 8 of
the Arizona Constitution regardless of the position the United
States Supreme Court would take on this issue. While our consti-
tutional provisions were generally intended to incorporate federal
protections, they are specific in preserving the sanctity of homes
and in creating a right of privacy.132
Occasionally this penchant for recognizing rights results in a depar-
ture from federal norm even when the state provision is identical to the
federal. For example, in the Colorado death penalty case People v.
Young,1 33 the court found the Colorado death penalty sentencing stat-
ute 1 34 invalid on its face because of the state constitutional prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.1 35 The court ignored the federal
standard, justifying its holding based on its responsibility to evaluate
state constitutional provisions independently.
The eighth amendment [sic] to the United States Constitution
also prohibits "cruel and unusual punishments," and the four-
teenth amendment [sic] forbids any state to deprive any person of
life "without due process of law." The existence of federal constitu-
tional provisions essentially the same as those to be found in our
state constitution does not abrogate our responsibility to engage in
an independent analysis of state constitutional principles in resolv-
ing a state constitutional question. This responsibility springs from
the inherently separate and independent functions of the states in a
system of federalism.
We have recognized and exercised our independent role on a
number of occasions and on several have determined that the Colo-
rado Constitution provides more protection for our citizens than
do similarly or identically worded provisions of the United States
130. Id at 401-02.
131. 724 P.2d 545 (Ariz. 1986).
132. Id at 552 (citation omitted).
133. 814 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1991) (en bane).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1986 & 1990 Supp.).
135. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 20.
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Constitution.... This history reflects our repeated recognition that
the Colorado Constitution, written to address the concerns of our
own citizens and tailored to our unique regional location, is a
source of protection for individual rights that is independent of and
supplemental to the protections provided by the United States
Constitution.
136
Perhaps the most intriguing variety of this exercise of state policy
independence occurs when a state effectively overrules a United States
Supreme Court ruling on a matter of state law by announcing a new and
higher standard. In People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books,'137 the state of
New York repudiated the federal standard after the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Arcara v. Cloud Books.138 The federal court had reversed the
state court's ruling that provided protection for an adult bookstore
owner from an attempt to close the store under state public nuisance
laws. The Court of Appeals held that the nuisance law was content-neu-
tral and "[t]o the extent the order might have an effect on the defendant's
legitimate bookselling activities, it was deemed to be too remote to impli-
cate First Amendment concerns." 139 The New York court noted that
"we must now decide whether greater protections are afforded under the
State Constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression."' 140 The court
ruled in the affirmative:
New York has a long history and tradition of fostering freedom of
expression, often tolerating and supporting works which in other
States would be found offensive to the community. Thus, the mini-
mal national standard established by the Supreme Court for First
Amendment rights cannot be considered dispositive in determining
the scope of this State's constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression.
It is established in this State that the government may not im-
pose a prior restraint on freedom of expression to silence an unpop-
ular view, absent a showing on the record that such expression will
immediately and irreparably create public injury. It is also settled
that when government regulation designed to carry out a legiti-
136. Young, 814 P.2d at 842-43 (citation omitted).
137. 503 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
138. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
139. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 494.
140. Id. at 494. The New York Constitution provides:
Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or
abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indict-
ments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear
to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have
the right to determine the law and the fact.
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
BROWN IN STATE HANDS
mate and important State objective would incidentally burden free
expression, the government's action cannot be sustained unless the
State can rove that it is no broader than needed to achieve its
purpose. 14P
The trend of states' general willingness to function independently of
federal policies suggests that, in systemic terms, there is more than
enough liberty to go around.1 42  Federalism has provided a fertile
ground for the expansion of rights that has proven fruitful for state
policymakers on a variety of subjects. This systemic freedom to respond
to needs at the local level can also be measured in personal terms when
rights in the abstract are delivered to individuals through the public pol-
icy machinery. The anti-liberty myth of the Brown era, long overdue for
debunking, is that the legal and moral imperatives of Brown somehow
divest states of local control over educational equality matters. Racial
classifications excepted, this has never been the case. Properly viewed,
the modem challenge of solving educational inequality in the states is one
of engineering, determining how to deliver what every state policymaker
says is desirable-a meaningful opportunity to an education.
B. Educational Equality and State Policymaking
Surveying state court decisions on educational issues, one is struck
by how often the logic is patterned after the Supreme Court ruling in
Rodriguez.143 Even attempts to disavow Rodriguez tend to adopt its
assumptions.
The influence of Rodriguez arises out of the test used by the Court
for determining whether education was a fundamental right. The Jus-
tices readily acknowledged the disparity present in the scheme used by
the State of Texas to finance public education, but reasoned that "the
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." 144
Under this test, the Court quickly reached an outcome denying the
plaintiffs any relief.145 There was no history to suggest a federal commit-
141. Arcara, 503 N.E.2d at 495.
142. For a discussion of state court decisions that expand the scope of rights protection in
noneducational areas, see Ronald K. L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away from a
Reactionary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Hans A. Linde, First Things First:
Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379 (1980); Robert F. Williams,
Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1195 (1985).
143. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
144. Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
145. The Court stated:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in
the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws. Thus, the key to discovering
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ment to education as such. Education had always been within the prov-
ince of the states. The paradigm for a right "implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution" was the right to travel. This right, the Court said, "had
long been recognized [as a federal interest and] as a right of constitu-
tional significance... and did not require an ad hoc determination as to
the social or economic importance of that right."
146
While this logic in Rodriguez may have shielded state policies from
examination under the U.S. Constitution, many of their constitutions and
statutes made repeated references to the long recognized importance of
education.147 For many states, the language used to describe the impor-
tance of education provided a beacon for the well-aimed arguments of
opponents of current educational policies. In this way, the Rodriguez
test created potential difficulties for state policymakers on educational
issues without regard for the outcome of the case as a matter of federal
law. The Connecticut Supreme Court quickly recognized this potential
in a case involving a challenge to state school finance laws, noting, "[n]or
have we found the Rodriguez test.., of particular help---although under
that test it cannot be questioned but that in light of the Connecticut con-
stitutional recognition of the right to education (article eight, § 1) it is, in
Connecticut, a 'fundamental' right.
' 14 8
On the other hand, the rationale of Rodriguez also contained lan-
guage helpful to those states seeking a path away from their constitutions
and the history of commitment to public education. In dicta, the major-
ity noted that it was as concerned with the difficulties of quantifying a
constitutional standard as it was with ascertaining its textual basis. As to
the former, the Court stated:
whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in comparisons of the relative
societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be
found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather,
the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implic-
itly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under
our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so
protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone
cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and
economic legislation.
Id. (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 32.
147. See supra notes 15-17.
148. Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 372-73 (Conn. 1977). Compare Stuart Biegel, Reas-
sessing the Applicability of Fundamental Rights Analysis: The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Shaping of Educational Policy after Kadrmas v. Dickenson Public Schools, 74 CORNELL L.
Rnv. 1078 (1989), with Troy Reynolds, Note, Education Finance Reform Litigation and Sepa-
ration of Powers: Kentucky Makes Its Contribution, 80 Ky. L.J. 309 (1990).
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of educa-
tion is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful
exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present
levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education
that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if
a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of educa-
tional opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides
no basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where
only relative differences in spending levels are involved and
where-as is true in the present case-no charge fairly could be
made that the system fails to provide each child with an opportu-
nity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment
of the rhts of speech and of full participation in the political
process.'
Rodriguez, therefore, represents something of a picket fence for
states on opposite sides of the education-as-a-fundamental-right issue. A
few states have relied on language in their constitutions that provide for a
"thorough and efficient" or a "uniform" education, or have used the
state equal protection clause as the basis for making education a funda-
mental right. 50 Perhaps the most substantive decision in this regard is
the Kentucky decision in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.."' where
the state court detailed the factors that make for an "efficient"
education. 152
149. Rodiguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
150. See, eg., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 769 P.2d
684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
151. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
152, The court listed the following factors:
1) The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Ken-
tucky as the sole responsibility of the General Assembly.
2) Common schools shall be free and available to all.
3) Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children.
4) Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state.
5) Common schools shall provide equal education opportunities to all Ken-
tucky children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances.
6) Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure that
they are operated with no waste, no duplication, no
is management, and with no political influence.
7) The premise for the existence of schools is that all children in Kentucky have
a constitutional right to an adequate education.
8) The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide
each child in Kentucky an adequate education.
9) An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the
seven capacities recited previously.
Id. at 212-23.
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The majority of states fall on the other side, however, embracing in
some form the outcome of Rodriguez with little or no attention given to
the implications of their own constitutions or their current habit of show-
ing solicitude for individual rights in other areas.1 13 Typically, these
courts apply a mere rational basis analysis to reviewing disparate educa-
tional inequality suits. Education is not treated as a fundamental right.
These states also demur on the fairness issue, usually relying on the his-
tory of the education clauses to avoid finding an equality principle in the
"uniform" or "efficient" notions. Moreover, the courts in these decisions
are uncomfortable addressing these matters, usually opining that it is not
the role of the judiciary to promote equality on the subject of education
when current policies are emphasizing local control. States on this side
of the Rodriguez fence present a posture of avoidance, even when com-
pelled by a constitutional provision that declares education a fundamen-
tal right-like the Wisconsin court in Kukor v. Grover154---refusing to
apply some form of stricter scrutiny, on the belief that the state legisla-
ture and the citizens of the states were better equipped to make decisions
about educational standards than the courts.15 The influence of Brown
153. See Lujan v. Colorado State Bd., 649 P.2d 1005, 1022-23 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v.
Thomas, 235 S.E.2d 156, 167-68 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engeking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho
1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 789 (Md. 1983); Board of
Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Board of
Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (Ohio 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v.
State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979); Kukor v.
Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 580 (Wis. 1989).
154. 436 N.W.2d 568, 580 (Wis. 1989).
155. Id. at 582-83. There is at least one case that reaches the same outcome, but which is
more defensible as a correct application of substantive due process norms. In Hootch v. Alaska
State-Operated School System, 536 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1975), the Alaska Supreme Court reaf-
firmed that education is a fundamental right under its constitution. The court had previously
spoken of such a right in Macauley v. Hildebrand, 491 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1971), and Breese v.
Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972). Acknowledging the Rodriguez test, the Alaska court
noted that "[i]n construing art. VII, § 1 of the Alaska Constitution, we are free to give a
different construction from that of the United States Supreme Court." Hootch, 536 P.2d at
804 n.42. The Alaska court ruled that although the right to education is fundamental, the
right was not absolute. At issue there was a policy of the State that required school-aged
youths in far away rural areas to travel great distances in order to get to the public school. Id.
at 796-97. Taking an "undue burden" approach, much like that currently used in federal
privacy cases, such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), the court ruled
that the right to an education did not place a duty on the state to place public schools wherever
potential students lived.
We conclude that art. VII, § 1 permits some differences in the manner of provid-
ing education. Reference to the events proeeding [sic] the ratification of the Alaska
Constitution further bolsters our conclusion. The delegates to the constitutional con-
vention were aware that the principal Alaska opposition to statehood was based on
arguments that the territory could not afford the costs of a state government....
It may well be that the exercise of the right to education is burdened by certain
disadvantages. The existence of disadvantages is not, however, tantamount to a vio-
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is absent in these decisions as reliance by the courts on history and sepa-
ration of powers poorly mask what appears to be a disinclination to take
the inequality of their school-aged plaintiffs seriously.156
The reliance by state courts on history and the separation of powers
principle poorly masks a disinclination to take the inequality claims of
their school-aged plaintiffs seriously. The separation of powers argu-
ment-that the role of judges in shaping and prompting the resolution of
constitutional disputes has natural limits that are surpassed in educa-
tional policy disputes-is particularly thin. The sentiment of the Mary-
land courts is typical of state courts which believe that:
it is not within the power or province of members of the Judiciary
to advance their own personal wishes or to implement their own
personal notions of fairness under the guise of constitutional inter-
pretation. The quantity and quality of educational opportunities to
be made available to the State's public school children is a determi-
nation committed to the legislature or to the people of Maryland
through adoption of an appropriate amendment to. the State
Constitution. p,7
This notion has been roundly criticized as representing "a funda-
mentally flawed view of the concept of judicial review."15 One critic
notes that a major purpose of "unrepresentative judicial review is to as-
lation of the constitutional provision dictating that the right to education be open to
all. The contemplation in art. VII, § I of some differences in the manner of provid-
ing education sanctions some disadvantages. So long as they are not violative of
equal protection, the nature and proper means of overcoming the disadvantages pres-
ent questions for the legislature. Appellants have been afforded a right to education,
although they are not furnished a right to attend secondary schools in their commu-
nities of residence.
Hootch, 536 P.2d at 804-05.
It is hard to criticize Hootch. It follows rather closely the traditional strict scrutiny meth-
odology of balancing the nature of the state interest against the impact of the law on a funda-
mental right. While sensitive to the historical pattern of policies toward meaningful access to
an education, the Hootch court found compelling the government's argument against locating
schools in every remote village.
156. Measured in terms of impact alone, the states that rely on these arguments when
reviewing educational equality cases effectively close the door of the state judiciary to school-
aged plaintiffs, leaving them to fashion alternatives in the political arena. It is an odd way to
treat a fundamental right or to acknowledge legally mandated inequality.
Both separation of powers in constitutional adjudication and the use of history in consti-
tutional interpretation are more thoroughly examined in other scholarship. For excellent arti-
cles on these subjects see Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among
State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 731 (1982); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review
and the "Political Question" 79 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1031 (1985); and Joshua S. Lichtenstein,
Note, Abbott v. Burke: Reaffirming New Jersey's Constitutional Commitment to Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity, 20 HorsRA L. Rav. 429 (1991).
157. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 790 (Md. 1983).
158. Redish, supra note 156, at 1031.
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sure that the Constitution restrains majority will."' 59 Otherwise, "[i]f the
majoritarian branches could act as final arbiters of the limits of their own
power, there would have been little purpose in imposing super-
majoritarian constitutional limitations in the first place."''
The rationale of the states on this issue defies logic. As one com-
mentator has pointed out, whether viewed as raising a question of jus-
ticiability or general separation of powers issues, "it simply does not
follow that a constitutional mandate that imposes an affirmative duty
upon the legislature to provide for the education of the state's children
also grants the legislature unreviewable authority to determine when it
has complied with that constitutional mandate." ''
Even if one accepts the position of the state courts, then the question
arises whether or not the power of judicial review has any ascertainable
contours. This is not an idle inquiry, for riding on the outcome is ulti-
mately the scope of protection given to guarantees of individual rights.
"The fact that a provision [like the education clauses] vesting power re-
fers to the political branches and not to the judiciary cannot justify a
finding of a textual commitment of discretion to the political branches,
because the same could be said of virtually every provision vesting au-
thority in a political branch."' 62
Moreover, the view that state courts tend to ignore the influence of
Brown in decisionmaking is strengthened by the dichotomy created be-
tween the educational cases-laden with institutional concerns-and the
decisions in other areas of state substantive due process analysis. The
decision by the New York court in Arcara v. Cloud Books,'63 giving
greater protection than the federal constitution to sexually oriented ex-
pression, 1 4 is difficult to square with the decision in Board of Education,
Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist.'65 There the court used
the rational basis test to hold that the school finance scheme was consti-
tutional despite savage disparities in per pupil expenditures among the
state's school districts,166 except to suggest cynicism toward the goal of
educational equality.
Consider for example two cases decided within a year by the Ari-
zona courts. The Arizona Constitution mandates "a general and uni-
159. Id. at 1045.
160. Id. at 1045-46.
161. Lichtenstein, supra note 156, at 456-57.
162. Redish, supra note 156, at 1060.
163. 503 N.W.2d 492 (N.Y. 1986).
164. For a discussion of Arcara, see supra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
165. 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982).
166. For a discussion of Nyquist, see supra text accompanying notes 153-55.
form public school system..."I67 and "a system of common schools by
which a free school shall be established .... ."''6 In a school finance case,
Shofstall v. Hollins,"'69 the Arizona Supreme Court held that its constitu-
tion established education as a fundamental right. It held "that the con-
stitution does establish education as a fundamental right. ... . [T]he
constitution, by its provisions, assures to every child a basic educa-
tion."1 0 But the court then held that state public school finance laws
needed to meet only the rational-basis test rather than strict scrutiny.
17 1
As a result, the court rejected the challenge to the Arizona system of
school finance:
A school financing system which meets the educational mandates
of our constitution, i.e., uniform, free, available to all persons aged
six to twenty-one, and open a minimum of six months per year,
need otherwise be only rational, reasonable and neither discrimina-
tory nor capricious.
17 2
One year later, in a less sweeping challenge to state educational poli-
cies, the Arizona court relied on some newly-discovered teeth fundamen-
tal right jurisprudence to produce a result that appears to conflict with its
rational basis standard. In Carpio v. Tucson High School District, 73 the
court quoted Brown heavily in support of its ruling that "indigent high
school students who cannot afford textbooks must be provided as ade-
quate an educational opportunity as students who can afford to buy their
own textbooks."1 74 The books, reasoned the court, "may remain the
property of the school district but a sufficient number of them must be
made available so that indigent students can have access to them."
175
This kind of decisionmaking effectively undermines Brown as the incon-
sistencies in a string of decisions dilute the value of the education clauses
as a framework for coherent discourse by potential plaintiffs who are left
to guess as to how to make intelligible state claims.
1 76
167. ARiz. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
168. Axuz. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
169. 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973).
170. Id. at 592.
171. Id
172. Id.
173. 517 P.2d 1288 (Ariz. 1974).
174. Id. at 1295.
175. Id
176. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 764-65 (1992).
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C. History as a Barrier to Equality
State court reliance on history provides a less brittle justification for
ignoring the savage inequalities that many state policies produce. There
is a long tradition of limiting judicial review power by relying on the
intentions of the framers of a constitutional provision or statute. Current
Supreme Court views on substantive due process rely heavily on histori-
cal analysis.177 But when a state court relies on history to avoid resolv-
ing educational disparities, history offers only partial support for the
decision.
The Maryland Court of Appeals' use of history is typical. In
Hornbeck,178 the court concluded:
It is manifest from the history underlying the adoption of the Arti-
cle VIII of the 1867 Constitution... that the "thorough and effi-
cient" language of § 1 does not mandate uniformity in per pupil
funding and expenditures among the State's school districts. The
words of § 1 require no more than that the General Assembly, by
law, establish a "thorough and efficient" system of free public
schools throughout the State, funded by taxation or otherwise.
179
History lends support for the due process part of the analysis, which
is to say that the drafters of the education clause may not have intended
to create a fundamental right in state-financed public education. When a
fair reading of the history of state law does not support fundamental sta-
tus for education, a court would be hard-pressed to find a principled basis
for inventing it. However, the equality clauses typically found in the
constitutions of states that provide for a "uniform" education or a "thor-
ough and efficient" education need not be limited by a static historical
analysis. These clauses focus on the nature of what is offered without
regard for whether the state is obligated to offer anything. As such, they
are best interpreted in terms common to equal protection analysis; state
benefits and burdens should be scrutinized to ensure that similarly situ-
ated persons are treated similarly.180 The analysis is dynamic rather than
static.181
177. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
178. Horbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983).
179. Id at 776.
180. For the seminal article that is still instructive on equal protection and the doctrine of
reasonable classification, see Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 (1949).
181. In the 1992 abortion case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, writing for the Court on the significance of Brown v.
Board of Education in helping clarify standards of stare decisis noted: "[iln constitutional
adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the
thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response
to the Court's constitutional duty." Id. at 2809.
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Historical views on race have been modified by evolving doctrine.
As three Justices in Freeman (Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor) noted,
the impact of racial segregation on school policy generally is sufficiently
pervasive that judges must look at evidence of correlation.
School systems can identify a school as "black" or "white" in a
variety of ways; choosing to enroll a: racially identifiable student
population is only the most obvious. The Court has noted: "The
use of mobile classrooms, the drafting of student transfer policies,
the transportation of students, and the assignment of faculty and
staff, on racially identifiable bases, have the clear effect of earmark-
ing schools according to their racial composition." Keyes, 413
U.S., at 202. Because of the various methods for identifying
schools by race, even if a school district manages to desegregate
student assignments at one point, its failure to remedy the constitu-
tional violation in its entirety may result in resegregation, as neigh-
borhoods respond to the racially identifiable schools. Regardless of
the particular way in which the school district has encouraged resi-
dential segregation, this Court's decisions require that the school
district remedy the effect that such segregation has had on the
school system.
182
Brown as a legal force on educational policy is disregarded by the
majority of state courts because the role of the "concept of fairness" in
policymaking is misunderstood. In an educational inequality case, no
state could defend on the argument that its education clauses could with-
stand the scrutiny of the Brown mandate simply because its framers un-
derstood and approved of the racially separate schools. Reliance on
history is simply "an evasion of the difficulties of reading and the respon-
sibility of a judge to exercise judgment."
D. The Language of Accountability as a Barrier to Equality
Brown as a legal force should influence state court interpretations of
the education clauses in state constitutions. But states fear Brown less
after forty years because its equality mandate is becoming harder to
frame in a constitutional case. Aside from the difficulty of imposing
Brown remedies over an extended period of time (made plain by the
Court in Freeman), a plaintiff encounters the burden at the outset of es-
tablishing a case of government intent to discriminate. There remains
some confusion-to the comfort of states that ignore educational inequi-
ties--over the role of disproportionate impact in equal protection analy-
sis. The rule is supplied from the line of cases beginning with
182. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1458 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring, citation
omitted).
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Washington v. Davis,"8 3 where the Court announced that:
a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the
power of government to Clause simply because it may affect a
greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an in-
vidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.'84
Davis and its progeny are responsible for the distortion that creeps into
the de jure/de facto dichotomy in Brown cases. The notion that dispro-
portionate impact alone does not give rise to a constitutional violation
dangerously misleads state policymakers into believing that educational
inequalities are immune from the influence of Brown unless there is a
"smoking gun" proving official intent to make one class of school-aged
children less well-off. Spangler and Milliken offer support for the notion
that school districts under federal court supervision should not be ac-
countable for racial segregation attributable to the decisions of private
citizens. But Davis and cases after it do not support the notion often
attributed to them that state and local governments are presumed to op-
erate on a "clean slate." Even the Court in Davis agreed that
"[n]ecessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another."' 85
Thus, dynamic factors (race, poverty and other classifications) may
help in determining issues of fairness. The same assessment aids courts
in tailoring remedial measures to the nature of the disparity, to insure,
for example, an education that is, at least, minimally adequate. In public
school cases, therefore, educational disparity should not be excused by
references to historical determinations of fairness. The Kentucky
Supreme Court rejected such excuses in an education finance case by ask-
ing: "Can anyone seriously argue that these disparities do not affect the
basic educational opportunities of those children in the poorer districts?
To ask the question is to answer it. Children in 80% of local school
districts in this Commonwealth are not as well-educated as those in the
other 20%. ''186
183. 26 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that a test given to applicants for positions on the District
of Columbia police force did not violate the Constitution despite a disproportionate failure rate
among black applicants).
184. Id. at 242.
185. Id. See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
186. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989).
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E. Non-Judicial Policymaking on Education: Fear of Equalizing
Elected officials have played an even greater role than state judiciar-
ies in resisting meaningfil reforms in public education. Kozol observes
that "social policy in the United States, to the extent that it concerns
black children and poor children, has been turned back several decades.
[T]his assertion... is not adequate to speak about the present-day reality
in public education. In public schooling, social policy has been turned
back almost one hundred years."
18 7
This is not a debate easily won, however, because most state officials
are not convinced that educational equality is an end to be desired.
Spared from having to discuss the disparity in racial terms because of the
decline in desegregation orders as a result of the demise of Brown, "they
look at equity for all and see it spelling excellence for none."
188
The evidence is overwhelming that the vitality of Brown in state
hands will depend on how much substance state policymakers give to the
notions of an education that is "uniform" or "thorough and efficient" or
which takes place in a "safe" learning environment. The present view-
point is reflected in lawsuits challenging state education finance laws.
The rise in litigation challenging school finance laws was a direct result
of state legislators' unwillingness to initiate reform without political pres-
sure or court intervention. 18 9 Even with court intervention, the states
have been slow to make changes.
190
F. The School Funding Quagmire
As a result of legislative unwillingness or inability to equalize fund-
ing between districts, citizens of over forty states have challenged the
constitutionality of public school financing methods under their state
constitutions. 191 Reform cases have attempted either to obtain greater
187. KozoL, supra note 2, at 4.
188. KozoL, supra note 2, at 173.
189. Between 1972 and 1979, at least 22 states modified their educational finance systems.
Some states were motivated by political pressure and others by judicial pressure and orders.
By April 1980, approximately 30 states were or had been involved in litigation over their
school finance systems. KiRP, supra note 66, at 592.
190. See infra notes 221-41 and accompanying text.
191. Historically, educational opportunity has been defined primarily in terms of resources
(including, among other elements, universally available and free education, common curricu-
lum and equality of resources within a given district). Starting in the late 1960s and early
1970s, state courts and legislatures turned their attention to the inequalities in educational
opportunity between school districts. Fiscal pressure on school districts, taxpayer revolts
against rising costs of education, concern with equity on the part of school finance scholars,
legal experts, citizen groups, foundations, various other reform-minded organizations and gov-
ernment officials brought school finance reform into being in the 1970s. KiRP, supra note 66,
at 592.
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funding for all schools or, alternatively, to obtain substantial equality of
funding for all of the school districts within a given state. As of January
1993, twenty-three states have completed litigation bringing such consti-
tutional challenges.1 92 But most of these claims have met with little suc-
cess. Only ten states have found that their system violates the state
constitution. 1
93
While specific details of school funding programs vary from state to
state, these programs have several shared characteristics. Every state ex-
cept Hawaii relies on a system of funding consisting of both local and
state contributions.' 94 Local funds are derived from property taxes and
then supplemented by state funds."' School districts raise ninety-eight
192. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1); Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Edue., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359
(Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537
P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46 (I. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d
758 (Md. 1983); Milliken v. Green 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated as certification
improvidently granted, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. One
v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert denied, 414
U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed,
459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. Ct.
App.), appeal dismissed, 361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813
(Ohio 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d
1135 (Okla. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sch. Funding, Inc. v. State 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991);
Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470
(S.C. 1988); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. One v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va.
1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v.
Hersehler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). Additionally, other states
presently face similar school finance reform cases.
193. There is no regional or chronological pattern to the outcome of these cases. All of the
systems challenged have had at least some provision-either flat grants, foundation programs,
or power equalization programs (which are addressed in greater detail later in this article)-
designed to effect at least partial equalization of funding inequalities. Nor is there any indica-
tion that a particular type of provision bears on the outcome of the case. William E. Thro,
Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School
Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1643 (1989).
194. Hawaii collects all local and state funds and then distributes them equally between
two at-large school districts. Hawaii has true equality of funding throughout the state. While
the state constitution divides the state into two at-large districts, all money spent on public
education is raised and distributed by the state department of education. Thro, supra note 193,
at 1643; see also Jonathan Banks, Note, State Constitutional Analysis of Public School Finance
Reform Cases: Myth or Methodology?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 129, 132 (1992).
195. Reutter and Hamilton observed:
School taxes are state and not local in nature, even though they are levied by the
local district. This result follows logically from the concept that education is a state
and not a local function.... [A] district may be compelled to establish and maintain
schools of a given standard and the burden of financing them may be imposed upon
the local district without the consent of its inhabitants.
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percent of their revenues through property taxes.196 A district's real
property (the value of buildings and land) effectively defines its wealth.
The presence of valuable real property or, more accurately, a high ratio
of valuable property to the number of school children, makes a commu-
nity wealthy in educational finance terms.197 The assessment of property
poses extremely difficult problems. Kirp and Yudof address the
problems this way:
[I]t is often difficult to establish the market value of such different
kinds of property as residences, farmland, factories, utilities, golf
courses - and for political reasons; that is, there is often great
pressure to hold down assessments, particularly assessments on
residential relative to commercial property.... Inequalities in rev-
enue per pupil among school districts within a state are primarily
the result of differences among districts in per pupil taxable prop-
erty base. The differences often are three or four to one.' 98
E. EDMUND REUTrER, JR. & ROBERT R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 179
(2d ed. 1976). On the other hand, it is almost as an accident of history that schools continue to
be funded by local property taxes in the manner that we see today. The taxation policy was
put into place in the 19th century when the public school system was created, and not since
that time has there been a reevaluation by any state legislature of the premise that local funds
should be the primary source of revenue for local schools.
196. KIRP, supra note 66, at 556.
197. Although states now make major contributions, local school districts still pay most of
the bill. In 1982 the annual bill was $43 billion. Id.
198. Id. at 592. It is often argued that money is not the answer to the problems that
confront our schools. In fact, President Bush suggested that increased funding of primary and
secondary schools would not change the state of our nation's school system. The Boston Globe
analyzed the former President's position as follows:
American industry is demanding a new generation of highly educated workers but
the schools aren't producing them. The problem can't be money because the United
States already spends more per student than most other industrial countries. So it
must be the teachers' unions and the educational bureaucracy. What's needed is to
shake up both with school choice.
Peter G. Gosselin, No More Quick Fixes; Education Seen as Best Hope for Repairing Economy;
Can it Deliver?, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1992, at Al. The Bush Administration believed the
federal government should serve as a catalyst for change but not provide the funds for that
change.
While it is true that throwing money at the problem is not the answer, the Supreme Court
has recognized that monetary inequities do play a role in unequal education. Furthermore, the
absence of empirical data to prove the impact of money is not surprising. Data would have to
be obtained by comparing students in well-funded districts to students in poorly-funded dis-
tricts, before and after their education-an obviously difficult task. But consider the following:
[In 1986,] a class of 30 students in St. James Parish, the fifth best funded district [in
Louisiana, had] $91,990 spent on its education annually. In St. Martin Parish, the
fifth worst funded district, the 30 student class [received] $66,360 in funding. It
seems plain that the $25,630 difference [could not help but affect] the quality of edu-
cation in the two districts, whether the additional money [was] used for better class-
rooms, teachers, special programs, or other educational expenses.
Douglas McKeige, Comment, Inequality in Louisiana Public School Finance: Should Educa-
tional Quality Depend on a Student's School District Residency?, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1269, 1269
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The desire of school boards and voters to support education also
plays an important role in the variations in the levels of expenditures.199
High school district taxes can be a disincentive for businesses to move
into or remain in an area so business interests can become a subtle indi-
rect lobby against increased funding.
In addition to funds raised locally and supplemented by the state,
federal funds make up a small minority of the overall school budget.
These limited funds have further diminished within the last twelve
years.2°° Moreover, state supplemental moneys do not attempt to equal-
ize the funding reaching each school district.2"1 In other words, a poorer
district can raise less money for its schools from property taxes then a
more affluent district because of the value of the property, and the state
does not then contribute enough funds to enable the poorer district to
catch up.2"2 The existence of wide disparities in the amount of money
available to individual school districts within a given state inhibits
achievement of an overall system of high quality public education. These
disparities are largely the result of vast differences in the value of taxable
real property within each district.20 3
n.2 (1986). Few would argue (with a straight face) that money does not make a difference in
the quality of the education a child receives. For an excellent discussion on this issue, see
generally KozoL, supra note 2.
199. KozoL, supra note 2, at 221-22.
200. Between 1980 and 1988 the federal outlays for the Department of Education de-
creased as a percentage of the Gross National Product from 0.6% to 0.4%, funding for the
Department as a percentage of the federal budget declined from 2.5% to 1.8%, and the federal
share of all primary and secondary education expenditures dropped from 8.7% to 6.2%. The
federal government contributed less than a dime of every dollar spent on primary and secon-
dary education and former President Bush only sought $783 million dollars for his school
choice package in 1993, less than 0.4% of the $218 billion annually spent on our Nation's
public schools. Gosselin, supra note 198, at Al.
201. KIRP, supra note 66, at 593; Banks, supra note 194, at 129.
202. Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which they are unable
to escape.
Because of their inadequate tax base, [property-poor districts] must tax themselves at
significantly higher rates in order to meet the minimum requirements for accredita-
tion; yet their educational programs are typically inferior. The location of new in-
dustry and development is strongly influenced by tax rates and the quality of local
schools. Thus the property-poor districts, with their higher tax rates and inferior
schools are unable to attract new industry or development and so have little opportu-
nity to improve their tax base.
Banks, supra note 194, at 132 n.15 (citing Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d
391, 393 (Tex. 1989)).
203. For example, in Michigan after Milliken v. Green, the state set out in the next years to
demonstrate that it could make the segregated schools a little less unequal by providing a per-
pupil "minimum" of funding aid to every district, which led one commentator to remark:
[A]s has been the case in other states, however, Michigan pegged the minimum so
low as to perpetuate the inequalities. In 1988 the average minimum guarantee was
[Vol. 20:521
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G. State Funding Methods
There are three formulas that states have used to determine the
amount of funds to be distributed to each school district.2°4 The first is
called a "flat grant." This flat grant is a fixed number of dollars per
school child given to all districts, rich and poor. When a state uses the
flat grant it makes two assumptions. The first is that the differences in
local fiscal capacity are small and the state's responsibility is limited only
to aiding local districts to provide a basic or minimal level of educa-
tion.205 This decision leaves local communities or individual parents to
provide for education in excess of the minimum if they can afford it.
The second and most common formula is the "foundation
scheme."2"6 First introduced in the early 1920s, the formula attempts to
reconcile the right of local districts to support and govern their own
schools with the obligation of the state to lessen the disparity of educa-
tional provision among districts.2" 7 The theory is that any school dis-
$2,800-less than half of what the richest district had available. More important,
however, was the fact that the state minimum, which was expected to be assured by
legislative allocations, was dependent on the whim of legislators, and on the shifts in
economic trends.
KoZoL, supra note 2, at 202-03.
204. See Thro, supra note 193. According to Thro, the funding equalization plan is the
most effective, but he notes that "[o]ne difficulty with this approach is that the rate of taxation
is a function of the value that the district residents place on education. Thus, districts may
suffer because residents are unwilling to vote for higher taxes." Generally there is also "a
limitation on the amount of money the state will provide. For the most part these remedies
have failed to correct completely the vast disparities in funding." An example of this can be
found by looking at Texas. The Texas Court of Appeals observed:
The wealthiest school district has over $14,000,000 of property wealth per student,
while the poorest has approximately $20,000; this disparity reflects a 700 to 1 ratio.
The 300,000 students in the lowest-wealth schools have less than 3% of the state's
property wealth to support their education while the 300,000 students in the highest
wealth schools have over 25% of the state's property wealth; thus the 300,000 stu-
dents in the wealthiest districts have more than eight times the property value to
support their education as the 200,000 students in the poorest districts.
Kirby v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 761 S.W.2d 859, 867-86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). Furthermore, local revenues for public education decreased from
$7.2 billion in 1990-91 to $6.9 billion. State funding in terms of the amount allocated rose
from $800 million to $6.2 billion, but the state will not be able to provide the full amount and
it will fall short by $540 million under new state legislation. Melanie Markley, Schools See
Rise in Low-Income Students, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 20, 1992, at A42.
205. The practical problem here is there is no way to determine how much education is
minimally necessary. As a result, there is no way of knowing how much it will cost. Instead,
the flat grant is determined through the political process, which inevitably results in even lower
levels of funding than even proponents of the flat grant would suggest. WALTER I. GARMS ET
AL., SCHOOL FINANCE: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 188 (1978).
206. MARGARET E. GOERTZ ET AL., PLAIN TALK ABOUT SCHOOL FINANCE, THE NA-
TIONAL INSTrrUTE OF EDUCATION 15 (1978).
207. KOZOL, supra note 2, at 207-08.
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trict, even property poor districts, should be assured certain minimum
levels of revenue per pupil, provided the district makes its own effort to
raise funding by imposing stipulated minimum property tax rates. The
emphasis on localism derives from the respect for liberty-which is de-
fined, in this case, as the freedom of the district to provide for its youth-
and from the belief that it is more efficient for control of local schools to
be held by those who have the greatest stake in their success.
Jonathan Kozol suggests that in its pure form the foundation pro-
gram operates somewhat like this:
(1) A local tax upon the value of homes and businesses within a
given district raises the initial funds required for the operations of
the public schools. (2) In the wealthiest districts, this is frequently
enough to operate an adequate school system. Less affluent dis-
tricts levy a tax at the same rate as the richest districts-which
assures that the tax burden on all citizens is equally apportioned
(in many instances the less affluent districts are willing to institute
taxes on themselves which are higher than those of the more afflu-
ent districts so that their schools will have access to greater fund-
ing)-but, -because the property is worth less in the poorer
community, the revenue derived will be inadequate to operate a
system on the level of the richest district. (3) The state will then
provide sufficient funds to lift the poorer districts to a level (the
foundation) roughly equal to that of the richest districts.
20
In theory, this program creates something close to revenue equality.
In practice, however, the program is not strictly followed, causing inequi-
ties between school districts. Kozol further notes that even if the pro-
gram were strictly followed it would still not satisfy the greater needs
that exist in districts that have greater numbers of retarded, handi-
capped, or Spanish-speaking children.20 9 In these districts it is more ex-
pensive to meet the special needs of these children. The program would
succeed in treating districts, but not children, equally.2"0
The third of these formulas is "percentage equalizing. 2 11 The state
assists a district depending on its "ability" to attain the amount of fund-
ing the district determines is appropriate. The district determines the
size of its budget and the state provides a share of the budget determined
208. Id at 208.
209. Id.
210. Even this degree of equal funding is rarely achieved. Furthermore, a continual area of
debate with foundation programs is how to determine the "foundation." States frequently
adopt a "low foundation," a level of subsistence that will raise a district to a point at which its
schools are able to provide a "minimum" or "basic" education, but not an education on the
level found in the rich districts. Id.
211. For a detailed analysis of the flat grant, foundation grant, and percentage equalizing
formulas, see GARMS, supra note 205, at 185-211.
by the district's "aid ratio." An aid ratio is determined by a specific
formula.212 The degree to which the percentage equalizing plan equal-
izes expenditures depends on the level of state support. The larger the
state share of expenditures, the more equalizing the plan. In addition,
the local district must choose a level of educational expenditures. Two
districts of equal property wealth often do not spend the same amount of
money on education, and the district with the higher expenditure level
receives more state aid. The choice or the ability of a district to spend
more money can result in wealthy districts receiving more state aid than
poorer ones.213
Each of the three formulas can be demonstrated to have equalizing
effects, reducing the differences in the amount of money spent per pupil.
But the equalizing effects are often not very strong, even when not ham-
pered by special "save harmless" provisions added for political reasons.
Typically legislatures add provisions that guarantee every district that it
will receive the same amount of aid it received the prior year even though
a straight application of the formula would indicate lessening of aid in
the coming year.21 4 These provisions maintain disparities among dis-
tricts in the amount of money spent per pupil.
A problem with all three programs is that often legislatures will of-
fer the wealthy districts an incentive in order to win their backing for an
equalizing plan of any kind, no matter how inadequate. 1 5 The incentive
is to grant some portion of state aid to all school districts, regardless of
their poverty or wealth. While less state aid is naturally expected to be
given to the wealthy than the poor, the notion of giving something to all
districts is believed to "be a sweetener" that will assure a broad enough
electoral appeal to raise the necessary funds through statewide taxes.21 6
In several states, however, these "sweeteners" have been so sweet that
they have sometimes ended up by deepening the preexisting
inequalities.217
212. KIRP, supra note 66, at 593-94.
213. GOERTZ, supra note 206, at 21.
214. "Save harmless" or "save from harm" provisions insure that the amount of state aid
received by a district (either per pupil or total) under a new plan will not differ radically from
payments received in a prior year. GOERTZ, supra note 206, at 23.
215. In Los Angeles, a suit was brought five years ago by black and latino parents alleging
school funding inequities in Los Angeles Unified School District. The district spends as much
as $400 a year less per pupil in predominantly minority elementary schools. A settlement
decree was proposed to eliminate the disparity in funding. Sandy Banks, Schools Consider
Major Change in Funding Methods, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at BI.
216. KozoL, supra note 2, at 209.
217. Id. at 211
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The opposition to the drive for equal funding in a given state is
sometimes cast as local (district) rights in opposition to the powers of the
state. While local control may be defended and supported on a number
of important grounds, it is unmistakable that it has been historically ad-
vanced to counter equity demands.218 Yet offsetting this "local versus
state" control or "state versus federal" control argument is the reality
that state and federal governments are willing to subvert local control
when it suits their purposes and only avoid the issue when it comes to
equal funding issues. For example, states establish uniform curricula for
all school districts, certify teachers on a statewide basis, and adopt text-
books on a statewide basis. Local control is defined by what the local
school board has the power to determine: how clean the floors will be,
how well the principal and teachers will be paid, whether the classrooms
will be adequately heated, whether the school will be able to provide
enough books for its students and its library, whether there is a play-
ground for the kids to play on, whether the school has computers for its
students or for its administrators.219 If the school board has sufficient
money, it can exercise some real control. If it has very little money, it
has almost no control; or rather it has only negative control.220
The history of the education reform battle between the courts and
the legislature in the state of New Jersey is a clear indicator of the gulf
that will sometimes exist between what the law seems to require in the
way of educational equality, and what state policymakers are willing to
accept.22 In 1973, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided Robinson
v. Cahill.222 The court ruled that the state scheme (the foundation plan)
218. Id.
219. School boards can have implied powers related only to education. Members are se-
lected as the legislature prescribes and their powers may be extended or limited in the discre-
tion of the legislature. In no instance can a board enlarge its powers so as to conflict with state
regulation. Moreover, school boards do not have unfettered control of public money for pur-
poses deemed by them to be for the good of the education of the children. For example, the
Supreme Court of Washington in McGilvra v. Seattle School District No. 1, 194 P.2d 817
(Wash. 1921), held that the maintenance of a "clinic" is beyond the authority of the local
school board under its implied powers. E. EDMUND REUTMER, JR., THE LAW OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION 139-40 (3d ed. 1985).
220. REUTrER, supra note 219, at 139-40.
221. The history of the Robinson case reads like the "case that would not die." Robinson
came before the New Jersey Supreme Court seven times in thirteen years. See Robinson v.
Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (Robinson 1); Robinson v. Cahill,
306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1974) (Robinson 11); Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson
Il); Robinson v. Cahill, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975) (Robinson IV);
Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V); Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457
(N.J. 1976) (Robinson VI); Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V1). In
effect it lives on in the recent Abbott litigation. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
222. Robinson I, 303 A.2d 273.
of funding its public schools violated the "thorough and efficient" clause
of the state constitution.223 It held that the guaranteed foundation level
of $400 per student was inadequate to provide all public school students
with a quality education.
224
The court compared two New Jersey school districts in Mercer
County, one in Princeton and the other in Trenton. Princeton was by far
the richer district, having property valued four times greater than prop-
erty in Trenton. But both districts had to assess property at a rate
greater than the state minimum of 1.05 cent per dollar of taxable prop-
erty value. Trenton levied a tax at the rate of 2.8 cents per dollar and
Princeton's tax rate was 1.71 cents per dollar of property taxed.225
The court found that this scheme created an unacceptable inequality
because, although the Trenton community taxed its property at a higher
rate, the Princeton tax generated more per pupil funding ($581.28) than
the Trenton revenue ($362.67).226 The New Jersey court postponed a
final ruling on the case to give the legislature sufficient time to re-
spond.227 The legislature did nothing for over two years. Finally, in
1975, the court decided it had a "plain, stark and unmistakable" obliga-
tion to act.228
The New Jersey Supreme Court then issued an order requiring state
officials to distribute several million dollars in aid to reduce the gap in
per-pupil expenditures between rich and poor school districts.229 Before
the order took effect, however, the court gave the state four months in
which to remedy the educational inequality through legislation.230
One month before the court order was to take effect, the legislature
passed the Public School Education Act of 1975.231 The Act contained a
different equalization formula which was immediately challenged by par-
ents of school-aged children in poorer districts.232 The court was willing
to let the legislature develop the program "assuming it [was] fully
funded."
233




227. Robinson v. Cahill, 306 A.2d 65, 66 (N.J. 1974) (Robinson I).
228. Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) (Robinson II1); Robinson v. Cahill, 351
A.2d 713, 716 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson IF).
229. Robinson IV, 351 A.2d at 721-22.
230. Id at 722.
231. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 18A:7A-1 to -52 (West 1989).
232. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129, 131 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson V).
233. Id at 139.
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The New Jersey legislature never funded the Act. This was due in
part to its disagreement with the Governor over whether an income tax
needed to be imposed on its citizens. By 1976, however, the courts de-
cided to act once again. The Supreme Court enjoined the state from
funding any public educational programs until it provided full funding
for the 1975 Act.234 There was a brief stalemate which resulted in the
closing of the public schools. Finally, the legislature passed laws provid-
ing for the funding of the Act through an income tax-the first in the
history of New Jersey.
In 1981, a new round of litigation began in which the parents of
students in poor school districts challenged the constitutionality of the
1975 Act.235  The New Jersey court ruled in favor of the parents.
Figures for school funding in New Jersey for the 1988-89 school year
revealed that the Princeton district-still among the richest districts in
the state-spent $7,725 per pupil as compared to $3,538 for Camden, one
of the poorest districts.236
In California, the battle for educational equality has also taken so-
bering twists. In 1963, the state courts adopted a more expansive version
of Brown, requiring local school officials to eliminate racial segregation
"regardless of the cause of such segregation." 237 This policy was re-
versed by an amendment to the state constitution that modified its equal
protection clause to provide that:
[n]o court of this state may impose upon the State of California or
any public entity, board, or official any obligation or responsibility
with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil trans-
portation, except to remedy a specific violation by such party that
would also constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.238
Voter revolt through constitutional amendment also affected Cali-
fornia policymaking on solutions to inequality in educational financing.
In Serrano v. Priest,2 39 the California Supreme Court invalidated the state
234. Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976) (Robinson VI).
235. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 365 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott I1).
236. KozoL, supra note 2, app. at 236 (citing statistics from the Educational Law Center,
Newark, N.J.).
237. Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976). See also Jackson v. Pasadena
City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1963). Compare Jackson with the federal standard in
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
238. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a) (originally passed as Proposition 1). See Crawford v. City
of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527 (1982). In Crawford, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity
of Proposition 1 because it merely repealed legislation that was not required in the first in-
stance by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 545.
239. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); appeal after remand, Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal.
1976).
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educational funding scheme and required that the state create a system to
eliminate the disparity of funding between wealthy school districts and
poor districts. This announcement so shocked citizens that it provided
the catalyst for Proposition 13 and other tax revolt measures that, in
effect, placed a constitutional cap on the amount of taxes that could be
assessed on citizens to pay for state funded programs. Now "while Cali-
fornia ranks eighth in per capita income in the nation, the share of its
income that goes to public education is a meager 3.8 percent-placing
California forty-sixth among the fifty states." 2' Kozol describes Califor-




There is much to consider in a legal environment that places states
in control of educational equality issues. There are some who feel that
the Brown mandate was flawed initially and failed in its mission.242 It is
not overly cynical to acknowledge, as has the Supreme Court, that par-
tial compliance with the Brown mandate is now an accepted substitute
for what initially was a much broader vision.243
There remains a striking contrast of states willing to progressively
move forward in creating and augmenting rights for its citizens, but mov-
ing just as decisively away from making a commitment to an equal edu-
cation for its school-aged children. Terms ordinarily used in discussions
defining justice have lost their meaning for children left out of the educa-
tion loop.
240. KOZOL, supra, note 2, at 221.
241. Id at 220.
242. See Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 4. "Within the domain of constitutional law, Brown
has stood for the value of 'judicial activism' on behalf of human rights. Yet, paradoxically,
from the point of view of those seeking substantial integration of the public schools, Brown was
a failure. The Supreme Court endorsed a formula of gradual desegregation that provided the
opportunity for massive resistance in the Deep South and for token desegregation elsewhere."
Id. at 1867.
243. The Court in Freeman describes the factual setting the DeKalb County case as one
common to Brown cases generally:
For decades before our decision in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1), and our
mandate in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), which ordered school districts
to desegregate with "all deliberate speed," DCSS was segregated by law. DCSS's
initial response to the mandate of Brown II was an all too familiar one. Interpreting
"all deliberate speed" as giving latitude to delay steps to desegregate, DCSS took no
positive action toward desegregation until the 1966-1967 school year, when it did
nothing more than adopt a freedom of choice transfer plan. Some black students
chose to attend former dejure white schools, but the plan had no significant effect on
the former dejure black schools.
Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1436 (1992) (citations omitted).
Spring 19931
572 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:521
The "victory" for Raymond Abbott, the student responsible for the
most recent challenge of the New Jersey educational finance laws, is de-
scribed by Kozol:
Raymond Abbott... is today a 19 year-old high school dropout
with the reading skills of a child in the seventh grade. A learning-
disabled student who spent eight years in the Camden public
schools, his problems were never diagnosed and he was passed on
each year from grade to grade .... On the day that the decision
came down from the court, Abbott, now a cocaine addict, heard
the news of his belated vindication from a small cell in the Camden
County Jail.2 4
The notion of "good faith" in state officials has taken on a quality
that ignores a pattern of behavior that has effectively institutionalized
racism and poverty. In Freeman, the concurring Justices point out that
"[ilt would seem especially misguided to place unqualified reliance on the
school board's promises in this case, because the two areas of the school
system the District Court found still in violation of the Constitution-
expenditures and teacher assignments-are two of the Green factors over
which DCSS exercises the greatest control.
'245
The notion of "equality" has become skewed in such a manner that
it now competes with "liberty." As one state court puts it:
Traditionally, not only in Idaho but throughout most of the states
of the Union, the legislature has left the establishment, control and
management of the school to the parents and taxpayers in the com-
munity which it serves. The local residents organized the school
district pursuant to enabling legislation, imposed taxes upon them-
selves, built their own school house, elected their own trustees and
through them managed their own school. It was under these cir-
cumstances that the 'Little Red School House' became an Ameri-
can institution, the center of community life, and a pillar in the
American conception of freedom in education, and in local control
of institutions of local concern. In the American concept, there is
no greater right to the supervision of the education of the child
than that of the parent. In no other hands could it be safer.246
This philosophy accounts for the actions of state officials that de-
clare education to be a fundamental right, but then treat education equal-
ity issues as merely a social and economic option. It is a zero-sum game.
The equality clause cancels out the fundamental rights clause. There is a
curious pattern of resistance to a notion of "equality of educational op-
portunity" if it means "equality of opportunity through education" and
an equal chance to succeed. Or, as Coons, Clune, and Sugarman put it,
244. KozoL, supra note 2, at 172.
245. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1456.
246. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 645 (Idaho 1975).
"tlhe crucial value to be preserved is the [equal] opportunity to succeed,
not the uniformity of success."24 7
It is clear that the educational opportunity game is being played on
a different field than existed when the Brown mandate was declared in
1955 (Brown I1). Demographics have recast the manner in which we look
at statistical imbalances, so that not every disparity yields a constitu-
tional case. Legislative motives are not automatically suspect when these
imbalances are present. And as Scalia's concurrence in Freeman estab-
lishes, any legal implications of statistical imbalance diminish over
time.
248
However, many elements in the game have remained the same. Ed-
ucational opportunity is still dependant on where a school-aged citizen
lives. Today, while state and local laws requiring segregation have been
nullified, the goal of racial integration has not been achieved. According
to studies by the National School Boards Association, nearly two thirds
of all black youngsters (63.3 percent) still attend segregated schools.
249
Many large cities and a growing number of suburbs no longer have
enough white schoolchildren attending public schools to give their sys-
tems a white majority. Nor, in most cases, will parents or authorities
send suburban children to integrate city schools.2 ' Meaningful progress
in the integration of public schools for black children has not happened
since the early 1970s.251 Similarly, integration for other minorities never
truly began. Furthermore, in the twenty-five largest inner-city school
districts, there are actually more racially segregated schools today than
existed in 1954.252 The courts are not able to impose taxes to fund bus-
ing, which leaves it up to state legislatures.2" 3 State and local bodies are
247. JOHN E. COONS ET.AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 447 (1970).
248. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
249. ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNE-
QUAL 162 (1992).
250. Id.
251. Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285
(1992).
252. Id.
253. Among other concerns, there are federalism concerns:
By ordering state and local officials to exceed their statutory authority, judicial taxa-
tion also invades the state legislature's authority over the state executive branch.
[Ultimately,] unless a state fiscal scheme is "palpably arbitrary" or "hostile and op-
pressive ... against particular persons and classes," it cannot be invalidated by a
federal court. "The enormous problem implicit in redesigning taxation methods in
order to provide for a more equitable financing of present education policy issues is
best decided through legislative and political processes.
G. R. Wolohojian, Judicial Taxation in Desegregation Cases, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 332, 341
(1989) (citing Allied Stores v. Bowers, U.S. 522, 526 (1959), and Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
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ingenious in the extreme in devising superficially neutral plans (pupil
placement laws, ability grouping, freedom of choice) which are really just
subterfuges for keeping the races separate in the public schools.254
254. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: PAsr, PR sEr AND FUTURE 99 (Walter G. Stephan &
Joe R. Feagin eds., 1980).
Ability grouping/tracking has come increasingly under fire over the years. It is an issue,
and a policy implemented by local school districts, which must be considered seriously, and
independent of busing:
School systems can remain segregated even after a court-ordered school desegrega-
tion plan has been implemented. Ability grouping and exclusionary disciplinary
measures continue to isolate minority children from white children. It is often diffi-
cult to determine whether these practices are intentionally being used to segregate or
whether they are being used for educational purposes but have the unintended effect
of segregating.
Ktnu', supra note 66, at 564.
Every type of tracking program has significant racial consequences. These programs tend
to concentrate minority children in less-advanced school programs. The proportion of minor-
ity students assigned to special programs for the educable mentally retarded and placed in slow
learners' classes and nonacademic high school programs is typically two or three times greater
than their proportion of the school-age population. David L. Kirp, Schools as Sorters The
Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 705
(1973).
Furthermore, a study by the Rand Corporation found that disproportionately high num-
bers of black and latino students are assigned to low-ability mathematics and science classes,
while very few minorities gain access to high-ability classes. In addition, the study found that
low-ability classes are frequently taught by less qualified teachers and receive fewer resources,
including science laboratories and equipment. Even in elementary schools, 65% of math and
science classes are tracked, and the tracking is strongly correlated with race, although tracking
in these earlier years is less based on an academic record than in high school. The report
determined that high-ability students in the least advantaged and predominantly minority
schools may actually have fewer opportunities and less qualified teachers than low-ability stu-
dents in schools that are more than 90% white. KIRP, supra note 66, at 573. Often these
students are given tenured teachers who are no longer effective in the classroom. Also, these
tracked classes are not used to improve the ability of these children to learn. Instead of provid-
ing material that the upper-tracked students are getting (the "more advanced" children) in a
more comprehensible format to bring these "slower" children up to speed so that they can
eventually enter more advanced classes, usually these children simply receive the exact same
material presented more slowly with little or no attempt to provide instruction that would
bring these children up to speed.
Little Rock School District v. Pulaski County Special School District No. 1, 584 F. Supp.
328 (E.D. Ark. 1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, 778 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1186 (1986), is an example of the use of these types of programs to eliminate the
continuing vestiges of a segregated school system that persist as discriminatory educational
practices. The district court approved new procedural safeguards proposed by the North Lit-
tle Rock School District for determining the assignment of students to special education and
gifted programs, after finding that the District had administered such programs in a discrimi-
natory fashion.
The court was alerted to the fact that 20% of the black student body had been classified as
mentally retarded or learning disabled; the court found that "[n]o valid testing procedure
could end up placing one out of every four or five children in special education." Id. at 349.
In addition, only 9.4% of the gifted program's students were black. According to the court,
this was "an underrepresentation of blacks in the gifted program of 6.8 standard deviations,
rVol. 20:521
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Thirty-two states contain 98.2 percent of America's black popula-
tion.2 5 In the majority of these states over fifty percent of the black
population continues to attend segregated schools.256 So one might ask
the question, how far have we really come to ending segregation and can
the goals set forth in Brown ever be accomplished? Sadly, the language
which would occur only seven times in a billion chance." Id See also Tracy E. Sivitz, Note,
Eliminating the Continuing Effects of the Violation: Compensatory Education as a Remedy for
Unlawful School Segregation, 97 YALE L.J. 1173 (1988).
255. HACKER, supra note 249, at 162. It must be recognized that this table does not indi-
cate the number of schools attended by a majority of other minority students, specifically
hispanics. In recent years the number of schools attended by a mix of minorities as increased
dramatically. All of the issues discussed above apply to hispanics as well. Additionally, the
question of bilingual education and segregation has been studied and litigated heavily. Because
of the overwhelming amount of information and difficulty of compilation, these issues are not
specifically addressed here. Such issues as funding, busing, and ability grouping/tracking are
equally applicable.
256. Consider the following statistics:




































Idk at 163. These statistics come from the National School Boards Association. Id.
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of inequality after Brown represents a poor repackaging; beneath
demographics the victims remain the same-the poor, the nonwhite. 5 7
Black children are almost three times as likely as whites to grow up
in poor surroundings.2 8 This Article does not consider the probability
that hispanic children will grow up in poverty, but recent looks at Texas
and California indicate that the number of poor hispanic children enter-
ing public schools is ever increasing.
259
Federal educational policies continue to be a key factor of influence.
This is as clear now as it was immediately after Brown was handed down,
when states like Arkansas 6" chose to resist attempts to desegregate. It
may be an influence of convenience, but it suggests a dual responsibility
for making educational equality a reality.
The Brown experience has changed the manner in which states think
about educational policy. Brown first created a language for characteriz-




All Persons 8.8% 31.9% 3.63%
All Children 15.8% 44.8% 2.82%
All Families 8.1% 29.3% 3.62%
Female Headed Households 37.9% 56.1% 1.48%
Table II
Where Poor Americans Live
White Black




258. Id. at 162.
259. See generally HACKER, supra note 249.
260. The response of the State of Arkansas to the Brown jurisprudence is generally well-
known, because it served to highlight the opposition of the southern states to desegregation
orders. In 1959, the Arkansas legislature passed a law giving the governor the power to close
public schools to prevent desegregation. Garrett v. Faubus, 323 S.W.2d 877 (Ark. 1959).
Later, these same laws were upheld as valid policy power measures to insure public safety in
the event of violence in communities faced with integration. Smith v. Faubus, 327 S.W.2d 562
(Ark. 1959).
Since that time, Arkansas policymakers have relied mainly on their constitution to resolve
educational equality issues. It has found no duties created by its educational clause. The
Arkansas Constitution requires public schools that are "general, suitable and efficient" system
of free public schools. But this provision has been interpreted to "merely authorizefl the legis-
lature or individual school districts, to fund the education of these persons, should it choose to
do so. The language of the amendment is not mandatory. It does not require the general
assembly or school districts to expend any funds.... It merely authorizes such action." Op.
Ark. Att'y. Gen. 92-072 (1992); see also Magnolia Sch. Dist. No. 14 v. Arkansas State Bd. of
Educ., 799 S.W.2d 791 (Ark. 1990).
ing the activities of state and local governments (de facto versus de jure,
invidious versus benign). This language was intended to help the courts
determine when and how governments were liable for the inequalities in
pupil assignments. This lexicon has also facilitated a defensive posture,
in effect highlighting for state officials the kinds of inequalities for which
they will not be held responsible. Ironically, rather than serving to pro-
vide clarity and give teeth to the equality principle of Brown, this lan-
guage has led state officials to address educational policy matters as
though they were severable from other issues of individual rights where
states routinely fashion constitutional and legislative solutions. This be-
havior has served to create a love/hate relationship with education-a
sentimental allegiance to local control of schools combined with a ten-
dency to disown responsibility for developing meaningful educational
polices and disdain federally mandated programs.
The evidence suggests that a favorable outcome for Brown in state
hands is unlikely. State policymakers must restructure their thinking
about educational policy to give substance to the notion of an education
that is "uniform" or "thorough and efficient" or which takes place in a
"safe" learning environment. Continued failure to provide adequate edu-
cation for large numbers of our children suggests a future where educa-
tional policy will be standardized through additional federal judicial
intervention (the declaration that education is a fundamental right) or
through federal legislation. Such a development would provide an ironic
symmetry to the jurisprudential impact of the Brown era on the impor-
tance of educational equality.
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